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ABSTRACT
The landscape for patenting products and processes tied to the natural
world has changed dramatically in recent times as a result of a series of de-
cisions of the US Supreme Court, particularly Mayo Collaborative Services
v Prometheus Laboratories 566 U.S. 66 (2012) and Association for Molecular
Pathology vMyriad Genetics, Inc. 569U.S. 576 (2013) (Myriad).This article
critically analyses these decisions and themultitude of lower court decisions
that have followed them.This analysis provides support for the growing con-
cern in theUnited States that it will be increasingly difficult to use the patent
system to encourage the development of therapies and research intermedi-
ates useful in developing new therapeutic interventions. One option being
posited in the industry to deal with this problem is to lobby Congress to
reform the threshold patent eligibility standard in US patent law. It is ar-
gued in this paper that a more nuanced approach is preferable. Using the
experience in Australia as a case study, this paper argues that such an ap-
proach is feasible. Australia has been chosen for analysis because the thresh-
old patent eligibility standard is similar in both countries, much more so
that with the European Union, and because the highest court in Australia
has ruled on essentially the same patent as in Myriad, in D’Arcy v Myriad
Genetics, Inc [2015] HCA 35. In addition to the nuanced approach to eli-
gibility currently exercised by the Australian courts and patent office, Aus-
tralia also has a number of post-grant options for addressing the dynamics of
patent monopolies. These include experimental use, compulsory licensing,
and government use. It is concluded that, while it would be impractical to
attempt to replicate the Australian environment in the United States, there
is no reason why some lessons can’t be learned from the Australian experi-
ence with patenting nature.
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From the standpoint of the United States, modern genomic science began with a
land grab, with research organizations patenting isolated sequences (and partial se-
quences) of DNA upon their discovery, sometimes even before their scientific impli-
cations were known. Within the life sciences community, fears quickly emerged that
these patents would create an anticommons that would inhibit research;1 fairly soon it
becameclear that genepatentswould, indeed, interferewithpatient care andcould slow
the development of valuable medical technologies.2 To some, patent claims over ge-
netic informational content was also regarded as an abridgment of freedom of thought
and expression inways that implicated theConstitution’s First andFourteenthAmend-
ments as well as statutory protections regarding a patient’s right to personal medical
information.3
That period is, however, now largely over. With the completion of the Human
GenomeProject, sequencing human genes has become too routine to patent.4 Further-
more, the new generation of genetic research and diagnostic practice does not always
require the isolation of genes, and thus does not generally infringe claims to isolated
sequences.5 Most important, in a series of four cases, the Supreme Court affirmed the
continued existence of a judicial exception to patentability for laws of nature, natural
1 Robert Cook-Deegan & Subhashini Chandrasekharan, Patents and Genome-Wide DNA Sequence Analysis: Is
It Safe to Go into the Human Genome?, 42 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 42 (2014); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998).
2 Report of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society, Gene Patents
and Licensing Practices and Their Impact on Patient Access to Genetic Tests 1-4 (2010),
https://osp.od.nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/SACGHS patents report 2010.pdf (accessed
Sept. 12, 2018) [hereinafter SACGHS Report]
3 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365,
380, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert.
granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 566
U.S. 9023 (2012), and opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F. App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2012),
and aff’d, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Meredith Knight, ACLU to Myriad Genetics: Pa-
tients, Not Companies, Own Personal Genetic Data, GENETIC LITERACY PROJECT (July 12, 2016),
https://geneticliteracyproject.org/2016/07/12/aclu-myriad-genetics-patients-not-companies-personal-
genetic-data/ (accessed Sept. 12, 2018) (citing the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26,
29, and 42 U.S.C.). See also Daniel J. Kevles, From Eugenics to Patents: Genetics, Law, and Human Rights, 75
ANN. HUM. GENET. 326 (2011).
4 Cf. The Centre of International Economics, Final Report: Economic Analysis
of the Impact of Isolated Human Gene Patents 75-76 (Report, The CIE, May
2013),https://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/sites/g/files/net856/f/reports publications/economic analysis of
the impact of isolated human gene patents.pdf (accessed Sept. 12, 2018).
5 See eg J. C. Kwong et al.,Whole Genome Sequencing in Clinical and Public Health Microbiology, 47 PATHOL-
OGY 199 (2015); Christopher M. Holman, Mayo, Myriad, and the Future of Innovation in Molecular Diag-
nostics and Personalized Medicine, 15 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 639 (2014); Kenneth Offit et al., Gene Patents
and Personalized Cancer Care: Impact of the Myriad Case on Clinical Oncology, 31 J. CLIN. ONCOL.
2743 (2013); John Conley, Myriad, Finally; Supreme Court Surprises by Not Surprising, GENOMICS L.
REP., June18, 2013, https://theprivacyreport.com/2013/06/18/myriad-finally-supreme-court-surprises-by-
not-surprising/ (accessed Sept. 12, 2018) [http://perma.cc/LC8S-Z8PF];W.Nicholson Price II,Unblocked
Future: Why Gene Patents Won’t Hinder Whole Genome Sequencing and Personalized Medicine, 33 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1601 (2012). See also infra note 198 (describing the current market for diagnostics).
Patenting nature  3
phenomena, and abstract ideas.6 Specifically, in Association for Molecular Pathology v
Myriad Genetics, Inc. (Myriad),7 the Court held unpatentable claims that cover isolated
BRCA 1 and 2 sequences and their mutations, on the ground that these sequences,
which are associated with early onset breast and ovarian cancer, constitute products
of nature.
Paradoxically, however, ending the privatization of genetic information may have
created more problems than it solved.8 Myriad has been read as imposing a bar to
patenting all natural products. It possibly also bars the patentability of all products that
duplicate (or come close to duplicating) materials found in nature.9 Complicating the
picture, inMayo Collaborative Services v Prometheus Laboratories (Mayo), the Supreme
Court also barred patents on diagnostic tests that rely on correlations among natural
phenomena on the ground the relationships constitute principles of nature.10 As a re-
sult, there is a growing suspicion that it will be difficult to use the patent system to
encourage the development of a whole range of therapies and research intermediates
useful in developing new therapeutic interventions. These include proteins, kinases,
colony-stimulating factors (such as growth factors), peptides, antibodies, viruses, and
venoms.11 It alsomeans that advances in personalizedmedicine, which hold significant
promise for curing an array of diseases,mayno longer bepatent-eligible.12 Significantly,
such advances could include companion diagnostics—information about whether a
particular patient will benefit from a proposed therapy.13 Unlike earlier forays into ge-
nomics, which were centered at university and government laboratories, these new ap-
proaches aremainly the province of commercial diagnostic andpharmaceutical compa-
nies, which traditionally rely heavily on strong intellectual property protection to earn
profits on their investments.14
Firms interested in investing in new technologies are not sitting still in light of these
developments. Many are adopting new strategies for appropriating returns. Some are
experimenting with claiming strategies that protect products and processes that differ
6 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566
U.S. 66 (2012); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013); Alice v. CLS
Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
7 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
8 Robert M. Schwartz & Timo Minssen, Life after Myriad: The Uncertain Future of Patenting Biomedical Inno-
vation & Personalized Medicine in an International Context, 2015 INTELL.PROP.Q. 189 (2015) (critiquing U.S.
case law from a scientific perspective).
9 See generallyMateo Aboy et al.,AfterMyriad,What Types of Claim Amendments Change a Patent Ineligible Iso-
latedGene Claim Into an Eligible Patent ClaimThat Is ‘Markedly Different’ FromNature?, 35NAT. BIOTECHNOL.
820 (2018).
10 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
11 See eg Dan L. Burk,TheCurious Incident of the Supreme Court inMyriad Genetics, 90 NOTREDAME L. REV. 505
(2014); Jacob Sherkow, Patent Protection for Microbial Technologies, 364 FEMS MICROBIOL. LETT. fnx205
(2017).
12 An example is therapies that infuse patients with normal versions of a gene that is mutated in their own
bodies, see e Gina Kolata, In a First, GeneTherapy Halts a Fatal Brain Disease, NEWYORKTIMES, Oct, 5, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/health/gene-therapy-brain-disease.html?hp&action=click&
pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=second-column-region&region=top-news&
WT.nav=top-news (accessed Sept. 12, 2018).
13 See Arti Rai,Diagnostic Patents at the Supreme Court, 18 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1 (2014).
14 Cynthia H. Zhang& Y Philip Zhang,Maximizing the Commercial Value of PersonalizedTherapeutics and Com-
panion Diagnostics, 31 NAT. BIOTECHNOL. 803 (2013).
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(sometimes only slightly) from those found in nature.15 These patents may raise the
same concerns that were raised in connection with natural phenomena and principles
of nature.Other firms are said to be keeping information about natural phenomena and
correlations among them as trade secrets.16 This is a particularly worrisome develop-
ment as trade secrets arguably interfere evenmore than patents with dignitary interests
and can have their own deleterious effects on research and patient care.17 Momentum
is thus building inmany segments of the life sciences community to legislatively expand
the scope of patentable subject matter and to reverse theMyriad andMayo decisions.
For example, the Intellectual Property Owner’s Association (IPO) and the American
Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) have suggested amending the Patent
Act to permit protection of all discoveries, except for claims understood by the ordi-
nary person in the art to ‘exist in nature independently’ of human activity, or that ‘ex-
ist[] solely in the human mind’. In the view of these organizations, other provisions
of patent law, including the requirements of newness, nonobviousness, and disclosure,
will take care of most problematic cases.18 The American Bar Association (ABA) has
made a somewhat similar suggestion: it would expand patentable subject matter un-
less the right would ‘pre-empt the use of others of all practical applications’.19 These
changes pertain only toUS law.However, because research and diagnostics can be eas-
ily outsourced to placeswhere they canbeperformedwithout legal impediment,20 right
holders will want to ensure global exclusivity. Thus, any change in the patentability of
products and laws of nature in the United States is likely to find its way into the next
rounds of international negotiations on intellectual property protection.
15 See Aboy et al., supra note 9, at 824 (noting that examiners have allowed claims to nucleic acids that differ
only slightly from those found in nature; giving the example of adding a fluorescent label).
16 Schwartz & Minssen, supra note 8 at 210–11; Robert Cook-Deegan et al., The Next Controversy in ge-
netic Testing: Clinical Data as Trade Secrets?, 21 EUR. J. HUM. GENET. 585–88 (2013). See also John
Conley, ACLU v. Myriad Genetics, Round 2: The Problem of Governance-by-Guidance, Genomics Law
Report (June 9, 2016), https://theprivacyreport.com/2016/06/09/aclu-v-myriad-genetics-round-2-the-
problem-of-governance-by-guidance/ (accessed Sept. 12, 2018); ACLU HIPPA complaint, https://
www.aclu.org/legal-document/aclu-hipaa-complaint (accessed Sept. 12, 2018).
17 See eg Bhaven Sampat & Heidi L. Williams, How Do Patents Affect Follow-on Innovation? Evidence from the
Human Genome, NBER Working Paper 21666 (2017), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21666 (suggesting
that trade secrecy leads to less follow-on innovations than patents).
18 Intellectual Property Owners Association, Proposed Amendments to Patent Eligible Subject Matter Un-
der 35 U.S.C. § 101, Feb. 7, 2017, http://www.ipo.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/20170207 IPO-
101-TF-Proposed-Amendments-and-Report.pdf (accessed Sept. 12, 2018); American Intellectual Prop-
erty Law Association, AIPLA Legislative Proposal and Report on Patent Eligible Subject Matter (2017),
http://www.aipla.org/resources2/reports/2017AIPLADirect/Documents/AIPLA%20Report%20on%
20101%20Reform-5-19-17-Errata.pdf (accessed Sept. 12, 2018).
19 American Bar Association, Letter to Michelle K. Lee, Supplemental Comments Relatined to
Patentable Subject Matter Eligibility, Mar. 28, 2017, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/intellectual property law/advocacy/advocacy-20170328-comments.authcheckdam.pdf
(accessed Sept. 12, 2018). See also U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), Notice of
Roundtables and Request for Comments Related to Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 81 Fed.
Reg. 71485 (Oct, 17, 2016), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2016-10-17/pdf/2016-24888.pdf
(accessed Sept. 12, 2018); USPTO, Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Roundtable,
https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/comments-public/patent-subject-matter-eligibility-
roundtable-2 (accessed Sept. 12, 2018) (Dec. 5, 2016).
20 See Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) to
permit the importation of data, even when produced through a process patented in the United States).
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The time has therefore arrived to consider sensible ways in which to revise the legal
regime: to devise a rule on patentable subject matter that deals with technologies that
function as commercial outputs and research inputs and are significant for patient care,
and to consider whether changing the scope of patentability also requires rethinking
other facets of the patent regime. Proposals such as those made by the IPO, AIPLA,
and ABA have been greeted with considerable skepticism on the ground that other
provisions of patent law are too difficult and fact-bound to apply as readily as a subject
matter exclusionor that thenewness, nonobviousness, anddisclosure requirementswill
not be sufficient to deal with the problems that patenting nature presents.21 Further-
more, concepts like pre-emption and existence in nature or the human mind may be
too vague to be applied consistently.22 Some commentators have therefore looked to
the European Patent Convention and the EU Biotech Directive, which offer a more
generous approach to gene patents.23 It is not, however, clear that these rules work well
in Europe or that they would readily transfer from a civil law system that includesmany
specific exceptions to patentability to a common law system that relies on judge-made
law.24
We take a different tack. We compare the situation in the United States with that of
Australia. In our view, that comparison is particularly helpful because theMyriad case
was litigated to the highest court of Australia at roughly the same time as the case was
sub judice in theUnited States. It wasmotivated by similar considerations and based on
a similar statute, one that is similarly inflected with considerable judicial gloss. Yet the
outcomes and impact of the cases appear to be quite different.25 Using the Australian
decision and its aftermath, we identify limiting principles to the bars placed on patent-
ing nature and argue that these limits may be sufficient to permit patenting in areas
where the benefits of encouraging life sciences innovation through patenting outweigh
the costs. But given the reality that changes in the law are likely to be made, we next
consider a remarkable feature of the Australian case, where theMyriad decision made
little difference in terms of access to genetic information. We examine the factors in
Australian practice that ameliorated the effects of gene patenting prior to the decision
21 Paul R. Gugliuzza,QuickDecisions in Patent Cases, 106GEO. L.J. 619 (2018); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & James P.
Evans, From Bilski Back to Benson: Preemption, Inventing Around, and the Case of Genetic Diagnostics, 63 STAN.
L. REV. 1349, 1375 (2011). See also Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski by
Ordering Patent Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1673 (2010) (suggesting that the other
criteria should be considered first, and subject matter eligibility be considered only in residual cases).
22 Jacob S. Sherkow,TheNatural Complexity of Patent Eligibility, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2014); Katherine
J. Strandburg,Much Ado About Preemption, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 563, 569–86 (2012).
23 Convention on the Grant of European Patents, art. 52(3), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255, 13 I.L.M. 270;
Council Directive 98/44/EC, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13-14 (EC). See eg Jessica C. Lai,Myriad Genetics and the
BRCAPatents in Europe:The Implications of theU.S. SupremeCourtDecision, 5UC IRVINEL.REV. 1041 (2015);
JoshuaD. Sarnoff, Patent Eligible Medical and Biotechnology Inventions After Bilski, Prometheus, andMyriad, 19
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 393 (2011).
24 See eg Reinier B. Bakels, The Half Invention: The Inevitable Truth About the Invention Concept (2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2993744 (accessed Sept. 12, 2018) (recounting the
European PatentOffice’s attempt to arrive at a stable rule onwhat constitutes patentable subjectmatter in the
context of software and business methods); Burk, supra note 11, at n.149.
25 The differencemay also have legal significance for both countries, Australia–United States Free Trade Agree-
ment, U.S.-Austl., art. 17.9.14, May 8, 2004, 43 I. L. M. 1248 (endeavoring to reduce differences in law and
practice).
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inMyriad and suggest ways in which US law could better reflect those factors to create
greater certainty for all stakeholders.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Part I, we consider the USMyriad decision and its
case law progeny, along with PTO guidelines and survey evidence on how these guide-
lines are applied. For inventions generally drawn to statutory technology, what we see
is a two-step approach in which the first step requires the court to consider whether
the claim has ‘markedly different’ characteristics than what is found in nature (or for
processes, that they could not be performed using mental steps or critical thinking). If
the claim is not different enough, the second step is to ask whether the claim adds ‘sig-
nificantlymore’—enough to remove it from the judicial exception.26 We conclude this
approach is not viable. Not only does it fail to provide adequate guidance,27 theMayo
test makes it difficult to add a diagnostic step as the ‘significantlymore’ that saves a nat-
ural product from the patent bar andMyriadmakes adding a natural product element
insufficient todealwith thebar onpatentingprinciples.28 Because a third case,Limelight
Networks, Inc. v Akamai Techs., Inc.29 limits the ability of patent holders to successfully
assert method claims when the steps in the method are divided among unrelated ac-
tors, adding a treatment step may be similarly unavailing whenever the diagnosis and
the treatment are performed by different parties.30 Ironically, and depending on how
they are applied, the test may also fail to single out all of the inventions that raise con-
cerns for research and patient care.31
Part II examines the alternative approach in Australia. Here we argue that the facto-
rial test propounded by the AustralianHigh Court, as elaborated in Patent Office guid-
ance, significantly improves decision-making. To be sure, there are not as many cases
as there are in the United States, and Australia’s ‘Mayo moment’ occurred in a lower
court and has yet to be reviewed by the High Court. Still, we argue that this approach
holds considerable appeal. Part III considers what should occur if Congress concludes
that the current state of subject matter jurisprudence is not tolerable and expands the
reach of patenting to include all technological arts. Here, Australian practice is partic-
ularly illuminating. After describing the reasons why patenting did not create a thicket
impeding access there, this section discusses the ways in which those practices can be
translated into positive law for the United States.
I. AMP v.MYRIAD: THE US CASE
As related by historian Dan Kevles, theMyriad case began in 1990, when Mary-Claire
King, a professor at theUniversity ofCalifornia, traced theBRCA1gene to a locationon
chromosome 17.This was an important finding as mutations of BRCA change the pro-
26 USPTO, Subject Matter Eligibility Examples, May 2016, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/ieg-may-2016-ex.pdf (accessed Sept. 12, 2018).
27 Cf. Hal Wegner, The Mayo-Myriad PTO Guideline, http://www.patents4life.com/wp-content/uploads/
2014/03/MayoMyriadGuidelinesMarch5.pdf (“There is no concrete test to show whether a claimed inven-
tion is ‘significantly different”’ . . .) (accessed September 12, 2018).
28 See eg Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Cleveland Clinic Found.
v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
29 134 S.Ct. 2111 (2014).
30 See eg AlanD.Miller&BrianAmos, Successful Strategies for DiagnosticMethod Claims, 23 J.COMM’LBIOTECH.
39, 41 (2017).
31 See Sherkow, supra note 11, at 1-2 (questioning whether the breadth of patents on certain CRISPR technol-
ogy is narrow enough to permit research).
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tein the gene produces in ways that are associated with early-onset breast and ovarian
cancer. A race to characterize the gene ensued; it was won in 1994 byMark Skolnick, a
University ofUtah geneticist and cofounder ofMyriadGenetics, who quicklymoved to
patent the isolated gene and its mutations; Skolnick also set up diagnostic testing facil-
ities to detect the sequences in patients. He repeated these efforts a year later, when he
found theBRCA2gene,which is likewise associatedwith early-onset breast andovarian
cancer, on chromosome 13.32 For several years after these discoveries, multiple labora-
tories performed diagnostic tests involving the BRCA genes. However, in 1997Myriad
began to assert its US patents and clear both the diagnostic and research markets; in
2004, it apparently started to keep information on mutations, correlations with cancer
risk, and algorithms for interpreting genetic information as trade secrets.33
Fromapublic relations perspective, these actions provedMyriad’s undoing.As stud-
ies commissioned by theHealth andHuman Services Secretary’s Advisory Committee
onGenetics, Health, and Society (SACGHS) later found,34 centralizing genetic testing
in a single organization’s laboratories eliminated the ability of patients to obtain sec-
ond opinions (a significant problem for a diagnosis that can lead to surgery to remove
breasts and ovaries). Exclusivity also reduced the incentive to improve the tests or keep
them current with advances in the underlying science; it also made it impossible to en-
sure the quality of the existing test by comparing results from different laboratories.35
Furthermore, privatization led to break downs with insurers (particularly forMedicaid
patients), slowed the development of innovative diagnostic technologies, and impeded
the ability of researchers to find other genes associated with breast cancer.
Concerned about freedom of speech and the implications of recognizing exclusive
rights over genetic knowledge for patients, researchers, and science, the AmericanCivil
Liberties Union challenged these patents in 2009, naming as plaintiffs individuals and
organizationswith varying relationships to theMyriad patents.36The complaint sought
declarations that 15 patent claims related to BRCA 1 and 2 genes were invalid because
they barred learning, thinking, and transmitting genetic information in violation of the
First and FourteenthAmendments and because they are not drawn to statutory subject
matter under § 101 of the Patent Act, which does not extend to laws of nature, phenom-
ena (products) of nature, and abstract ideas.37 The challenged claims covered isolated
genomic DNA (gDNA, or native DNA) encoding BRCA proteins; complementary
DNA, exon sequences encoding these proteins (cDNA, generated in the laboratory
to exclude introns, noncoding regions of the DNA); diagnostic tests that compare a
32 DANIEL J. KEVLES, CAN THEY PATENT YOUR GENES, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (Mar. 7, 2013).
33 See Cook-Deegan et al, supra note 16.
34 Robert Cook-Deegan & Christopher Heaney,Gene Patents and Licensing: Case Studies Prepared for the Secre-
tary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society, 12 GENET. MED. S1–S2 (2010).
35 See James P. Evans, Putting Patents Before Patients, 12 GENET. MED. S1–S2 (2010); SACGHS Report, supra
note 2; AMP, 702 F.Supp. 207-213.
36 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 200-206 (S.D.N.Y.
2010), as amended (Apr. 5, 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted,
judgment vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 566 U.S. 902 (2012),
opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F. App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2012) and 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012),
aff’d inpart, rev’d inpart, 569U.S576 (2013). See alsoSandraS. Park,TheChallenge toGenePatents as Feminist
Patent Litigation, 19 TECH. & INNOVATION 659 (2018) (noting the choice of plaintiffs highlighted the civil
rights aspects of the case).
37 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
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patient’s sequence to known sequences; and screening tests to determine whether par-
ticular therapeutic substances were effective at halting the growth of cells carrying al-
tered BRCA genes.38 The case was ultimately decided by the Supreme Court. But be-
cause we question the Court’s disposition, the opinions generated along the way bear
consideration.
I.A. TheTrial CourtDecision
Thetrial court quickly focusedon the traditional challenges under thePatentAct, rather
than the novel claims sounding in constitutional law.39 Judge Sweet held the composi-
tion claims (to gDNAandcDNA)werenotpatentablebecause theywerenot ‘markedly
different’ from compositions found in nature, as he thought was required by prevailing
Supreme Court case law.40 Particularly crucial to the court was the way in which DNA
differed fromother chemical compositions. Relying on a statement ofMyriad’s own ex-
pert witness, Joseph Straus, to the effect that ‘Genes are of double nature’ in that they
are both chemicals and carriers of information,41 the court stressed that:
The information encoded in DNA is not information about its own molecular structure
incidental to its biological function, as is the casewith adrenaline or other chemicals found
in the body. Rather, the information encoded byDNA reflects its primary biological func-
tion: directing the synthesis of othermolecules in the body—namely, proteins, ‘biological
molecules of enormous importance’ which ‘catalyze biochemical reactions’ and consti-
tute the ‘major structural materials of the animal body’.42
According to the court, isolation, including removal of noncoding regions, did not
change that fundamental character. Both cDNA and gDNA were therefore found un-
patentable. In addition, the court held that analysis and comparison ofDNAsequences,
as described in the diagnostic claims, were abstract mental processes that failed to sat-
isfy the then-prevailing view that a machine or physical transformation was the key to
patentability.43 Similarly, it found that the screening claim, which involved comparing
the growth rate of cells, was no more than a claim to a scientific method and, as such,
was not patentable.44
38 AMP, 702 F. Supp. at 213–214.
39 Id. at 237-238 (dismissing the constitutional arguments once the patent claimswere found invalid on a theory
of constitutional avoidance).
40 Id. at 224, citing, among other cases, Am. Fruit Growers v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1931) and Dia-
mond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980).
41 The full statement of Straus, a world renown patent law professor and attorney, see IP Hall of Fame,
http://www.iphalloffame.com/joseph straus/ (accessed Sept. 12, 2018), was: ‘Genes are of double nature:
On the one hand, they are chemical substances or molecules. On the other hand, they are physical carriers of
information, i.e., where the actual biological function of this information is coding for proteins. Thus, inher-
ently genes are multifunctional’, AMP, 702 F. Supp. at 228.
42 Id., citing in reO’Farrell, 853F.2d894, 895–96 (Fed.Cir. 1988) and referencingLearnedHand’s Parke–Davis
& Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y.1911) (finding isolated adrenaline patentable).
43 Id. at 236, citing In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed.Cir. 2008), which was later affirmed by the Supreme Court
on other grounds, Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
44 AMP, 702 F. Supp. at 237.
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II.B. TheFederal Circuit Decision
The Federal Circuit agreed that the diagnostic claim was not patentable,45 but in all
other respects, it reversed the trial court. Rejecting the focus on DNA’s ‘informational
content’,46 Judge Lourie (formerly, an organic chemist47) conceived of DNA as a
chemical molecule—a ‘distinctive chemical form. . . an integral part of a larger struc-
tural complex, a chromosome’.48 Because the isolated gDNA claimed in the patent re-
quired cleaving the covalent bonds in the backboneof the native chemical composition,
he regarded the claimed DNA as markedly different from the molecule as found in na-
ture.Thus, it was, in his view, patentable.49 A fortiori, so too was cDNA.50 Similarly, he
considered the cancer screen patent-eligible because it included the concrete steps of
growing cells and manipulating them to determine their growth rate and thus was not
abstract.51
JudgeMoore concurred, albeit reluctantly on claims to longgDNAstrands.Whereas
she thought the short strands were patentable because they were not only markedly
different from nature, but also had utilities not found in nature, the longer strands had
only the differences in the bonding to distinguish them from nature.52 Writing on a
clean slate, Judge Moore would not have found these patentable. However, because
she recognized a strong reliance interest in DNA patents, she concurred in the result,
leaving it to Congress to determine whether such claims promote or inhibit science.53
Judge Bryson agreed with the others on the disposition regarding cDNA and the
method claims. However, he dissented on the patentability of the gDNA claims, ar-
guing that the patents would ‘have broad consequences, such as preempting methods
for whole-genome sequencing, even thoughMyriad’s contribution to the field is not re-
motely consonantwith such effects’.54 Further, hewas not impressed by the differences
relied upon by Judge Lourie because he considered the cleavage of bonds ‘necessarily
incidental to the extraction of the genes from the environment in which they are found
in nature’.55 He was especially concerned about a claim that he interpreted as covering
all isolated DNAs coding for the BRCA1 protein. Noting that it referred to a sequence
that was 24,000 nucleotides long with numerous gaps, he argued that:
An almost incalculably large number of newmolecules could be created by filling in those
gaps with almost any nucleotide sequence, and all of those molecules would fall within
the scope of [the] claim. Included in that set are many important molecular variations
to the BRCA1 gene that Myriad had not yet discovered and could not have chemically
45 Ass’n forMolecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent &TrademarkOffice, 653 F.3d 1329, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 2011),
citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010), which rejected reliance on the
machine or transformation test.
46 Id. at 1349.
47 United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Alan D. Lourie, Circuit Judge,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/alan-d-lourie-circuit-judge (accessed Sept. 12, 2018).
48 AMP, 653 F.3d at 1351.
49 Id. at 1352.
50 Id. at 1353.
51 Id. at 1358–59.
52 Id. at 1366–67.
53 Id. at 1371.
54 Id. at 1373.
55 Id. at 1375.
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described. Yet those molecules would share only one unifying characteristic: each codes
for the same protein as the naturally occurring BRCA1 gene.56
III.C. The SupremeCourtDecision
Given the split decision on the DNA claims, it was not surprising that the Supreme
Court agreed to entertain the case. Indeed, inmanyways it was primed to hear it. Start-
ing in the early 2000s the Court had become concerned with the impact of patents on
scientific andmedical advancement. In 2005, it encountered the crabbed way in which
the Federal Circuit interpreted a statutory research exemption that permits research
‘related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs’.57 InMerck v Integra, the Court, recog-
nizing the value of experimentation in developing new therapies, reversed the Federal
Circuit’s holding that only clinical research is covered by the exemption.58 At the same
time, however, theCourt acknowledged that the exemption did not extend to ‘basic sci-
entific research’.59 The next Term, in a dissent from the denial of certiorari in Lab.Corp.
v Metabolite (Metabolite), a case about the subject matter eligibility of a diagnostic test,
Justice Breyer opined that ‘sometimes too much patent protection can impede rather
than “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” the constitutional objective of
patent and copyright protection’.60 Bilski v Kappos, which barred patents on abstract
principles, followed in 2010.
More important, soon after the Federal Circuit’s decision inMyriad, the Court re-
viewed a case that raised theMetabolite issue concerning diagnostics. As foreshadowed
by Justice Breyer’s dissent in Metabolite, in Mayo the Court invalidated a patent on a
method for determining whether a patient was receiving the correct dose of a drug.61
The Court reasoned that a claim to a relationship between dose and effect is a natural
law; when such a claim includes nomore than ‘well-understood, routine, conventional
activity previously engaged in by researchers in the field’, the claim ties up use of the
underlying law, which can ‘inhibit future innovation’ premised on the law’s use, includ-
ing, in theMayo case, ‘thedevelopmentofmore refined treatment recommendations’.62
Thus, the Court concluded, claims stating laws of nature that do not include an ‘inven-
tive concept’ in the application of the law are unpatentable.63
BecauseMayo was handed down after the Federal Circuit’s decision in theMyriad
case, the Court’s first step in reviewingMyriadwas to ask the Federal Circuit to recon-
sider its decision in light ofMayo. 64 Oddly, however,Mayo barely played a role in any
of the subsequentMyriaddecisions.On remand, JudgeLourie dismissedMayo as solely
56 Id. at 1376.
57 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2018).
58 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
59 Id. at 206.
60 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126–27 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting
from the denial of certiorari).
61 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
62 Id. at 86–87
63 Id. at 83.
64 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012) (mem.) (order granting cer-
tiorari, vacating, and remanding).
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concerned with the preemption of laws of nature;65 JudgeMoore stuck to her previous
views even though she claimed to consider Mayo applicable;66 Judge Bryson did not
mention the decision at all—and, surprisingly, the Supreme Court barely referenced it
in its plenary review.67 Instead, the SupremeCourt started off by conceptualizingMyr-
iad’s invention much as Judge Sweet did, downplaying DNA’s character as a molec-
ular structure (as Justice Thomas put it, ‘Myriad’s claims are simply not expressed in
terms of chemical composition’68) and stressing its informational content (the ‘claim is
concerned primarily with the information contained in the genetic sequence, not with
the specific chemical composition of a particularmolecule’69).TheCourt did not, how-
ever, reach the same conclusion as Judge Sweet. Rather than focus on the question
whether information directing the synthesis of proteins is patentable subject matter,
the Court relied on the distinction between natural and artificial creation. Because it
considered the gDNA naturally occurring, it held it unpatentable. Since the cDNAwas
synthesized, the Court found it to be statutory subject matter.70
The natural/artificial distinction is not, however, satisfying as a theoretical matter
or helpful as legal guidance. Once the Court recognized the biological functioning of
DNA sequences, it is difficult to understand how it could distinguish between cDNA
and gDNA as both encode the identical information. Both raise the problem of inhibit-
ing science,whichwas the focusof JusticeBreyer’s concern inMetabolite.Moreover, the
ownershipofwhat are essentially biological instructions—whether embodied in gDNA
or cDNA—ties up principles about the relationships among the nucleotides compris-
ing DNA and the protein chains these nucleotides produce. Since these relationships
are at least as fundamental to future innovation as the laws at issue inMayo, it would
seem that the cDNA claims should be equally vulnerable to invalidation. (Indeed, the
informational nature of DNA—the extent to which it encodes a biological process—is
arguablywhy theCourt’s initial intuition inMyriadwas to remand it in light ofMayo.71)
The decision has other problematic features. Although the Court found cDNA
patentable, it recognized that sometimes native sequences do not contain noncoding
regions. Because such strands ‘may be indistinguishable from natural DNA’, Justice
Thomas opined that they are not patentable.72 Conversely, the Court noted that ‘[i]n
rare instances, a side effect of a viral infection of a cell can be the random incorporation
of fragments of the resulting cDNA, known as a pseudogene, into the genome’. Since
the Court thought these so-called pseudogenes ‘serve no purpose’, it held such strands
are patentable.73 In other words, cDNA is patentable except when it isn’t, while gDNA
is not patentable except when it is. Because detecting these special situations may not
65 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2012),
66 Id. at 1339–40.
67 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 586, 589 & 594 n.7 (2013).
68 Id. at 2118.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 2118–19.
71 Cf. Burk, supra note 11, at 506 (pointing out the curious nature of the remand), 516 (conceiving of infor-
mational molecules as embodying the process that leads to a product—in other words, the embodiment of a
principle).
72 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2119 (2013).
73 Id. at 2119 n. 8.
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be easy (and because science may someday identify a use for pseudogenes), these ex-
ceptions create an element of unpredictability for other gene-related patents.
Evenmore worrisome is the difficulty in determining the patentability of other sub-
stances that are based on nature, such as venoms isolated from animals and used in
research on alleviating pain, unmutated genes introduced into patients to stimulate the
development of normal proteins, antibodies produced by rats and then treated so that
they are close enough to human antibodies to withstand rejection, or proteins and ki-
nases that are used in the development of therapies. Since the Court never explained
why it ignored the cleaved bonds that were so important to Judge Lourie, it is not clear
how far a synthetic moleculemust depart from its naturally occurring analog to be con-
sidered patentable.The humanized rat antibody is one illustration of the difficulty; an-
other is Dan Burk’s example of a peptide nucleic acid, which is entirely artificial yet
carries the same sequence information as DNA.74 Furthermore, because the Court
never relied on the differences that JudgeMoore had pointed out in the ways in which
short (as opposed to long) strands ofDNA can be used, and because gDNA and cDNA
include the same instructions onmaking proteins, functional changes do not appear to
be a key feature of the analysis. Nor is it clear that the inventiveness of the synthesis
will matter. BecauseMayowas not, in the end, important to the decision inMyriad, ar-
guably Mayo’s methodology, and its reliance on an inventive concept, is irrelevant to
decisions about the patentability of phenomena of nature.75 And that is possibly true
even though the case afterMayo,Alice vCLSBank (Alice), emphasized thatwhenaclaim
is drawn to a judicial exception, patentability is saved only when there is ‘an “inventive
concept”—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that
the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself’.76 Certainly, theMyriadCourt didnotbother to look for such a concept:
Justice Thomas never asked whether generating cDNA is a ‘well-understood, routine,
conventional activity, previously engaged in by those in the field’, asMayo required.77
IV.D. TheAftermath
Subsequent events, including the PTO’s 2016 guidelines, its 2018 memoranda, and
PTO examples, a survey of issued patents, and the near 100 cases the Federal Cir-
cuit has decided since Alice, demonstrate how difficult it is to work with the Supreme
Court’s framework.78 Despite the uncertainty about the relationship betweenMyriad
74 Burk, supra note 11, at 509.
75 See generally, Jeffrey A. Lefstin,TheThree Faces of Prometheus: A Post-Alice Jurisprudence of Abstractions, 16
N.C. J. L. & TECH. 647, 659 (2015).
76 Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014)(internal quotation and citation to Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 82 (2012) omitted).
77 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 82 (2012).
78 See USPTO, Formulating a Subject Matter Eligibility Rejection and Evaluating the Applicant’s
Response to a Subject Matter Eligibility Rejection, May 4, 2016, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/ieg-may-2016-memo.pdf (accessed Sept. 12, 2018); Index of Eligibil-
ity Examples, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-dec-2016-ex index.pdf
(accessed Sept. 12, 2018) [hereinafter Subject Matter Examples]; Chart of Subject Mat-
ter Eligibility cases (May 3, 2018), available as a link in USPTO, Subject Matter Eligibility,
https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/examination-policy/subject-matter-eligibility
(accessed Sept. 12, 2018) [hereinafter PTOChart]. After this article was complete and the patents discussed
in this article issued, much of the PTO materials were incorporated in the Manual of Patent Examining
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and Mayo, the guidelines (and now the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure) ap-
ply theMayo approach to all subject matter eligibility issues. They instruct examiners
to determine whether claims are directed to a statutory category (Step 1). For a claim
that is within a statutory category, the examiner must next decide whether it is directed
to a judicial exception (for life sciences, a law of nature or a natural phenomenon) or
is ‘markedly different’ from the exception (Step 2A). If it is not different, the examiner
must then determine whether there are elements in the claim, alone or in combination,
that add ‘significantly more’ than the judicial exception, elements that amount tomore
than a well-understood, routine convention activity in the relevant art (Step 2B).
From the new life-sciences examples that accompany the 2016 guidelines, it is clear
that as far as the PTO is concerned, Step 2A is the more critical. The examples include
two products derived directly from nature.The first (Example 28, a vaccine) comprises
seven claims, six of which the PTOconsiders patent-eligible.Of those, five are regarded
as patent eligible because they covermaterial that is ‘markedly different’ under Step 2A;
in only one case is eligibility dependent on a finding that ‘significantlymore’ was added
per Step 2B. Claim 30 (a sweetener) includes six claims. Four are considered patent-
eligible, all because they are ‘markedly different’ from nature under step 2A. For diag-
nostics, the analysis is similar. In Example 31, which is based on theMyriad case, three
of the five claims are considered patentable because they are ‘markedly different’ from a
natural law or a mental act (Step 2A); only one is eligible because nonconventional ac-
tivity added ‘significantly more’ (Step 2B). While four of the seven claims in Example
29 (diagnosis and treatment of a hypothetical disease) are considered patent-eligible
under Step 2B, still there are two claims in this example that pass muster because of
Step 2A.Had the PTO considered Step 2B equally determinative, it would presumably
have offered more examples of how to use it.
The importance of Step 2A is even more evident in the Federal Circuit case law.
Of the nearly 100 cases listed by the PTO as of May 3, 2018, only 10 can be classi-
fied as involving laws or products of nature.79 Of these, in only three was the patent
upheld—tellingly, two on the ground that it was not directed at a patent-ineligible con-
cept (Step 2A, which confusingly, the court calls Step 1).80 Patent holders forced to the
second step thus mostly lost. Of the cases involving abstract ideas, the patent holder
prevailed in 10; seven because of Step 2A (aka Step 1), two on Step 2B; in the last case,
there is considerable ambiguity (and a dissent) as to how the court decided the claims
were statutory subjectmatter.81 It is, in short, much harder for the patentee towin once
Procedure in its January 2018 revision, see § 2106. See also Aboy et al., supra note 9; Miller & Amos, supra
note 30.
79 PTO Chart, supra note 78; In re Bhagat, No. 2016-2525, 2018 WL 1378062 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 16, 2018)
(nonprecedential); Exergen Corp. v. Kaz USA, Inc., No. 2016-2315, 2018 WL 1193529 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 8,
2018) (nonprecedential); Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d 1352 (Fed.
Cir. 2017); Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Genetic Techs. Ltd.
v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015); In re BRCA1- & BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litig., 774 F.3d 755
(Fed. Cir. 2014); In re Roslin Institute (Edinburgh), 750 F.3d 1333 (Fed.Cir.2014); SmartGene, Inc. v. Ad-
vanced Biological Labs., SA, 555 F. App’x 950, 954–55 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (nonprecedential).
80 Vanda Pharm. Inc. v. West-Ward Pharm. Int’l Ltd., 887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd.
v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
81 The seven Step (2B)—Step 1—cases are Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 880 F.3d 1356
(Fed. Cir. 2018); Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018) Visual Memory LLC v.
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the decision-maker decides the claim is drawn to a judicial exception under Step 2A.To
be sure, that might change now that the Federal Circuit’s Berkheimer v HP Inc. decision
(Berkheimer) has stressed the factual underpinnings of the second inquiry as towhether
the claims add elements that is not a well-understood, routine, conventional activity.82
Since the test now requires proof by clear and convincing evidence that the activity is
conventional, it may become easier for issued patents to survive the second step.83
Still, the near-dispositive nature of the first step in the analysis of life sciences cases
is not difficult to understand: it is not evident what the second step, which looks for
‘significantly more’, actually means. Following Berkheimer, the PTO issued a memo-
randum that attempts to clarify the analysis. It instructs examiners that the facts must
show not simply that the activity was known or obvious, but that it was ‘widely preva-
lent or in common use in the relevant industry’.84 Further, it states that if the activity
constitutes several elements, theymust be examined both individually and in combina-
tion. Whether the Supreme Court will approve this approach is an open question and
the PTO has asked for public comments.85 So far, the Office appears willing to accept
as ‘substantially more’ anything not already widely known, including material known,
but not for the particular application recited in the claim;86 or known and used by only
a few scientists; ormethods nonconventional at the time of the application, even if after
the date of invention or application, they became routine.87 It has not, however, come
NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343 (Fed.
Cir. 2017); Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. CQG, INC., 675 F. App’x 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (nonprecedential;
includes a Step 2B back-up);McRO, Inc. v. Bandai NamcoGames Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
Enfish, LLC v.Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016).The two Step 2B—Step 2—cases are: BAS-
COMGlob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT & TMobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016); DDRHoldings,
LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The ambiguous case is Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v.
Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (also raising the question whether eligibility must be
determined by the claims alone, or whether the specification can also be included).
82 Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018). See also Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades
Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
83 An example of the analysis is provided by a nonprecedential opinion in Exergen Corp. v. Kaz USA, Inc., No.
2016-2315, 2018WL 1193529, at ∗4 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 8, 2018).
84 USPTO, Memorandum on Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter El-
igibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheier v. HP, Inc.) (Apr. 19, 2018),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo-berkheimer-20180419.PDF (accessed
Sept. 12, 2018).
85 Department of Commerce, Request for Comments on Determining Whether a Claim Element is Well-
Understood, Routine, Conventional for Purposes of Subject Matter Eligibility, 83 Fed. Reg. 17536 (Apr. 20,
2018).
86 See eg SubjectMatter Examples, supra note 78 , Example 29, Claim 3 (‘use of porcine antibodies in veterinary
therapeutics was known tomost scientists in the field. But significantly, there is no evidence that porcine anti-
bodieswere routinely or conventionally used to detect humanproteins such as JUL-1’) andClaim5 (‘Vitamin
D was known to doctors, and was routinely and conventionally used as an oral supplement to maintain bone
health prior to applicant’s invention, and at the time the application was filed. However, mere knowledge of
vitaminD or its use in other ways to treat other medical conditions does not make the administration of topi-
cal vitaminD to treat julitis a conventional step that those in this fieldwould routinely practice.The evaluation
turns on whether the use of topical vitamin D was widely prevalent in the field at the time the invention was
made and the application was filed.’).
87 Id., Example 31, Claim 80 (‘Although Cool-Melt PCR was used by a few scientists in the field to amplify
nucleic acids at the time the invention was made and the application was filed, use by only a few scientists
does not make the technique routine or conventional in the field as a whole. Nor does it matter that at a later
time,Cool-Melt PCRbecame a routine and conventional technique. Instead, the evaluation turns onwhether
Patenting nature  15
down on another issue splitting the Federal Circuit: whether the ‘significantly more’
must be explicitly claimed or whether it is enough that it appears in the specification.88
It is also difficult to win under the second step because, as two of the life sci-
ences cases demonstrate, the ‘significantlymore’ cannot involve something that is itself
patent-ineligible.Thus, inAriosaDiagnostics, Inc. v Sequenom, Inc., the inventors haddis-
covered that paternally inherited cell-free fetal DNA (cffDNA) circulates in a pregnant
woman’s blood and they foundways to detect it and use it to determine fetal character-
istics. Although the test represents a major breakthrough in prenatal care, cffDNA is a
natural phenomenon and so fails to meet the requirement of Step 2A.The diagnosis is
a law of nature and therefore cannot save the invention under Step 2B.89 Similarly, in
Cleveland Clinic Found. v True Health Diagnostics LLC,90 a diagnostic based on the cor-
relation between an enzyme, myeloperoxidase (MPO), and cardiovascular disease is
ineligible under Step 2A because it is a law of nature;MPO is naturally occurring so de-
tecting it, as required by the claims, does not add enough ‘more’ to save the diagnostic’s
patentability.
It is also possible that courts (and the PTO) are reluctant to rely heavily on Step 2B
because that test may not serve anyone’s purposes. For the patent holder, ‘significantly
more’ is basically a limitation that can make the patent easy to invent around. In par-
ticular, some of the PTO’s examples of patentable subject matter include, as the non-
conventional addition, activity that could be performed by a party different from the
one using the patent-ineligible concept. For instance, Claim 5 in Example 29 adds to a
diagnostic step involving a law of nature, a treatment step (‘administering an effective
amount of topical vitamin D to the diagnosed patient’) that saves the diagnostic from
being considered unpatentable. However, if the treatment is not administered by the
entity that conducted the diagnosis, then all the steps recited in the patent will not have
been performed by the same party. Unless there is a close enough relationship among
them to meet the test set out in Limelight Networks, Inc. v Akamai Techs., Inc.,91 as in-
terpreted by the Federal Circuit92—a circumstance that those using the invention will
likely endeavor to avoid—there will be no one who can be regarded as an infringer.93
Nor is it clear that Step 2B will benefit the public by freeing fundamental processes
for use in follow-on innovation. Although the PTO examples are aimed at identifying
the use of Cool-Melt PCR to amplify nucleic acids was actually routinely or conventionally used by scientists
in this field at the time the invention was made and the application was filed.’).
88 See eg Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Reyna, J., dis-
senting).
89 788 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
90 859 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
91 134 S.Ct. 2111 (2014).
92 AkamaiTechs., Inc. v. LimelightNetworks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, 1023 (Fed.Cir. 2015) (requiring a principle–
agent relationship or when an ‘alleged infringer conditions participation in an activity or receipt of a bene-
fit upon performance of a step or steps of a patented method and establishes the manner or timing of that
performance’).
93 See Hunter Keeton & Kevin Mosier, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same Af-
ter Akamai v. Limelight V, BNA’s Patent, Trademark, and Copyright J. (Daily Ed.)(Sept. 8, 2017),
https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/454850/BBNAInsight PrintFinal Wolf Keeton AkamaiEffect.pdf (ac-
cessed Sept. 12, 2018). To be sure, the claim in Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. West-Ward Pharmaceuticals,
Ltd., 887 F.3d 1117, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018), which involved the use of a genetic diagnostic as part of amethod
of treatment, used the phrases ‘obtaining or having obtained’ and ‘performing or having performed’ the
diagnostic test.This may avoid the Limelight problem, depending on how the phrases are interpreted.
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features that ‘meaningfully limit the claim[s]’,94 meaningfulness is a slippery standard.
In particular, allowing patentability to turn on a step that later becomes conventional
will surely hamper future actors.
Putting the emphasis on Step 2A may, however, actually make patent eligibility
even harder to predict. In the case of abstractions (the bulk of the Federal Circuit case
law), a key problem is choosing the level of generality at which to describe the claim.95
The more abstract, the less there is left to consider when determining whether there is
something ‘markedly different’ about the claim. For the law of nature cases, there is an
analogous problem in that the analysis requires the identification of the law of nature.
Whether the claim is markedly different depends on how the decision-maker concep-
tualizes the law. For example, the law inMayo was about how a patient metabolizes a
pharmaceutical. Since the drug was artificially introduced into the body, it is a law of
nature only if that term is broadly conceived.
In the abstraction cases, imprecision in the starting point of the analysis leads to the
result that claims said to be improvements (or enhancements) are far more likely to be
considered patent-eligible, for the focus on the improvement persuades the court that
the advance is different from the underlying concept.96That dynamicmaybe true of the
life sciences cases as well. Consider, for example, Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v CellzDirect,
Inc.97 The invention was a method of preserving hepatocytes (a type of liver cell). The
trial court found the advance unpatentable because it was directed to the law of nature
that hepatocytes are capable of surviving multiple freeze-thaw cycles.The Federal Cir-
cuit reversed on a finding that the claims ‘are directed to a new and useful method of
preserving hepatocytes’—one that involved an improvement over the basic freeze-and-
thaw technique in that it required freezing and thawing the cells at least two times. Yet
it is unclear why the district court was wrong. Why is a better survival through double
freezing not itself a law of nature? Aside from the predictability problem, this approach
elevates the role of drafting, in direct contravention to one of the SupremeCourt’s con-
cerns inMayo.98 Similarly, inVanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. vWest-Ward Pharmaceuticals,
Ltd, the court emphasized that the advance was a ‘new way of using an existing drug’,
and found it patentable even though the ‘new way’ was, as inMayo, based on how the
patient responded to the treatment.99
94 See Example 28, Claim 3. See also Example 29, Claims 2 and 6.
95 See eg Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253, 1262-63 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Hughes, J.,
dissenting).
96 See eg McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (‘the claims
are . . . patent eligible because they effect an improvement in [a] technology or technical field’) (internal
quotes omitted); Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1300; Enfish LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1339–40 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). See also Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 880 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (‘We previously have held claims focused on various improvements of systems directed to patent
eligible subject matter under § 101’). Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1304 (Fed. Cir.
2018). See also USPTO, Memorandum on Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decisions (Apr. 2, 2018),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo-recent-sme-ctdec-20180402.PDF (accessed
Sept. 12, 2018), which in a two page memo, mentions variations on ‘improvement’ seven times.
97 827 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
98 MayoCollaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566U.S., at 72 (‘[Precedents] warn us against interpret-
ing patent statutes in ways that make patent eligibility depend simply on the draftsman’s art’ (internal quote
omitted).
99 887 F.3d 1117, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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For claims to products, the issue is somewhat different. There, Step 2A requires a
comparison between the claimed subject matter and material found in nature. That,
in turn, requires the identification of a basis for the comparison.100 As Brad Sherman
has pointed out, inMyriad, the comparison could have been between the instructions
in the cDNA and the instructions in the gDNA, but that was not the comparison the
Court made. Although the Court ignored the covalent bonds that influenced Judge
Lourie, it still followedhis approachof comparingmolecular compositions.Thus, it found
that eliminating the noncoding regions of the DNA made cDNA different enough to
patent.101 Furthermore, as we saw, the Court ignored pseudogenes, even though they
are found in nature.102
An evenmore significant problem is that the concept of ‘markedly’ in ‘markedly dif-
ferent’ is not defined by the case law, so it is not clear how different the claim must be
from the thing to which it is compared. In re Roslin, 103 which involved the patentability
of a cloned sheep, furnishes an example. Inholding the sheepwasnot patentable subject
matter because it was identical to a sheep found in nature, the court was unimpressed
by differences in mitochondrial DNA or the effect of the environment on the cloned
sheep’s genotype and physical characteristics.104 Furthermore, some claims covermul-
tiple embodiments. In those cases, presumably every embodiment must be different
from what occurs in nature, yet it is unlikely that every embodiment can be identi-
fied and compared to nature. There are also claims that are drawn to a combination of
known elements: is it enough that the combination does not occur naturally, or must
the combination also create functional differences in the final product?105 Finally, there
is a degree of fluidity as to what about the claimmakes it ‘markedly different’ and what
constitutes ‘significantly more’. Thus, the cases do not always clearly differentiate be-
tween eligibility by reason of Step 2A or 2B.106 Sometimes the Federal Circuit backs up
a finding on the first step with a finding on the second.107
The bottom line is that it is now extremely difficult to know how to successfully pro-
tect advances in the life sciences. Kathy Liddell and her co-authors surveyed patent
applications published between June 2010 and June 2013 which included at least one
claim to a simple isolated gene sequence. They found that inventors have tried eight
different prosecution strategies to differentiate their advances from phenomena of na-
ture.108 These were met with varying degrees of success, depending in part on what the
100 See Burk, supra note 11, at 516.
101 Brad Sherman,TheMeaning of Myriad, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1193, 1212–13 (2015).
102 See text at note 73, supra.
103 In re Roslin Institute (Edinburgh), 750 F.3d 1333 (Fed.Cir. 2014).
104 Id. at 1338–39; Sherman, supra note 101, at 1219–20.
105 See eg Subject Matter Examples, supra note 78, Example 28, Claim 3 (‘While the mixture of these two nat-
urally occurring components is novel and does not occur in nature, there is no indication that mixing these
components changes the structure, function, or other properties of the peptide or water.’).
106 See eg Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 129 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Vanda Pharm.
Inc. v. W.-Ward Pharm. Int’l Ltd., 887 F.3d 1117, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Prost, J., dissenting from a finding
that a method of treatment claim was patentable subject matter, arguing that that the court conflated the two
steps)
107 See egTradingTechs. Int’l, Inc. v. CQG, INC., 675 F. App’x 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (nonprecedential); Rapid
Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
108 Aboy et al., supra note 9, at 822 ((i) amending to cDNA, (ii) amending to nucleic acids with nonnaturally
occurring sequence variations, (iii) amending to nucleic acids recombinantly linked with heterologous se-
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examiner in question thought was or wasn’t found in nature.109 In some cases, the au-
thors questioned whether the differences claimed in the issued patents were ‘markedly
different’. For example, they found that examiners have allowed claims to nucleic acids
that differ only slightly from those found in nature, giving the example of adding a fluo-
rescent label.110 They also noted interexaminer variability on the issue and were skep-
tical as to whether the issued patents provided significant coverage.111 Similarly, Alan
Miller and Brian Amos reviewed 100 diagnostic method patents and found several dif-
ferent claiming strategies (depending, in part on when the applications were filed).
They found that the claims most likely to issue were those that included several steps,
used a specific agent in the diagnosis, included a treatment step, or avoided the term
‘diagnosis’.112 Like Liddell, they were concerned about the consistency of examination
across the examiner corps and the enforceability of the patents that issued.
In a sense, it is difficult to fathom how outcomes could be other than haphaz-
ard. Concepts like ‘markedly different’ and ‘significantly more’ can distinguish what is
patentable fromwhat is not only if accompanied by ametric forwhat counts as ‘marked’
or ‘significant’.That requires a theory for why a difference from nature is required at all.
While it is clear that the SupremeCourt became interested in the questionof patentable
subject matter out of a concern about inhibiting future innovation, that apprehension
appears to have dropped out of the equation. In Myriad, Justice Thomas did not dis-
tinguish among claims that specified all the nucleotides in the sequence and those that
included many unknown regions, even though Judge Bryson pointed out how much
broader the latter claims were. Nor did he adopt Judge Moore’s suggestion of think-
ing about long strands with no difference in functionality from nature differently from
short strands, which had very articulable (and possibly narrow) functionalities. Most
important, the Court never considered whether the artificiality of cDNA would make
rights over it any less chilling of future research than rights over gDNA.
The failure to consider preemption can be attributed directly to Mayo, where the
Court conceded that the law of nature at issue in the case—the relationship between a
metabolite of a drug and the appropriate dose of that drug—was extremely narrow and
had limited application.113 Bynonetheless finding the claimsunpatentable, thedecision
implied that preemptionwas not the sole concern.That said, theMayoCourt still noted
that future work (‘the development of more refined treatment recommendations’114)
could be inhibited by the patent and in Alice, the Court emphasized the preemption
point.115 Thus, the analysis of whether a claim is different enough or adds sufficiently
more should turn, at least in part, on whether the difference or addition is such that the
quences, (iv) amending to labeled nucleic acids, (v) amending to a nucleic acid in a vector, (vi) amending to
a nucleic acid recombined with a nonspecific regulatory sequence, (vii) amending with a type 2 change and a
negative claim clause, and (viii) amending to a nucleic acid so short that it does not naturally occur)
109 Id. at 823–24.
110 Id. at 824.
111 Id. at 825.
112 Miller & Amos, supra note 30, at 41.
113 566 U.S. at 86. See eg Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d 1352, 1363 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (noting that when a patent discloses unpatentable subject matters, preemption arguments are
moot).
114 Id. at 87.
115 Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354–55 (2014).
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claim preempts activity related to what the inventor discovered. Indeed, some judges
on the Federal Circuit appear to be approaching the problem this way.While some are
using what Judge Plager calls the common law method of comparing new cases with
the disposition in older ones,116 other jurists have tied the analysis to the goal of ‘main-
tain[ing] the incentive of “some future inventor, in the onward march of science” to
discover new ways of achieving the same result more cheaply and efficiently than has
the patentee.’117 Similarly, while the court applies theMayo two-step as its primary an-
alytical tool, it tends to sneak a peek at the preemptive effect of the claims it upholds.
For example, in CellzDirect the Court stated that
[W]hile pre-emption is not the test for determining patent-eligibility, it is certainly the
concern that undergirds . . . § 101 jurisprudence. Here, while not resting our opinion on
them,wenote thedistrict court’s findings that the ’929patent ‘doesnot lockup thenatural
law in its entirety’ and that ‘LTC has already managed to engineer around the patent’.
These findings accord with our conclusion that the patent is not “directed to” a patent-
ineligible building block of human ingenuity.118
To the extent that the § 101 analysis would be improved by adding to the test as
currently articulated a concern for preemption, the question is how to determine what
is too preemptive to patent. Judges Bryson andMoore offered a few clues, as has one of
us in previous work.119 For more, we turn to Australia.
II. THE AUSTRALIAN POSITION: D’ARCY, CARGILL AND MORE
II.A. D’Arcy vMyriad
At around the same time that proceedings were commenced against Myriad in the
United States, an actionwas brought against the firmbyCancerVoicesAustralia, a non-
profit association, and Yvonne D’Arcy, a breast cancer sufferer. Cancer Voices became
unincorporated during the proceedings but Ms D’Arcy continued her action through
to the High Court of Australia (the equivalent of the US Supreme Court).120 The ac-
tion followed a period of intense public scrutiny of the enforcement strategies of Myr-
iad’s licensee, Genetic Technologies Ltd. (GTG). GTG had threatened to enforce the
relevant patent against public testing laboratories during 2003 and again during 2008.
The Australian proceedings challenged the validity of claims in Australian patent num-
ber 686,004 (Patent 686,004), the key Australian BRCA 1 patent entitled ‘In vivo mu-
tations and polymorphisms in the 17q-linked breast and ovarian cancer susceptibility
116 See eg Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
117 Id. at 1309 (Reyna, J. dissenting, citing O’Reilly v, Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113 (1854).
118 827 F.3d at 1052 (internal quotations omitted). See also DDRHoldings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d
1245, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“It is also clear that the claims at issue do not attempt to preempt every ap-
plication of the idea’); BASCOMGlob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT & TMobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (‘Nor do the claims preempt all ways of filtering content’). Cf. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v.
Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting that ‘questions on preemption are inherent in
and resolved by the § 101 analysis’).
119 Dreyfuss & Evans, supra note 21 (suggesting four factors: the ability to invent around, the need for interop-
erability, the breadth of the prospects, and the identity of the inventor).
120 The Australian decisions are: Cancer Voices v. Myriad Genetics, Inc [2013] FCA 65; D’Arcy v. Myriad Ge-
netics, Inc [2014] FCAFC 115; D’Arcy v. Myriad Genetics, Inc [2015] HCA 35.
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gene’. This patent application was filed on August 11, 1995 and the granted patent ex-
pired on August 11, 2015, almost two months before the decision in D’Arcy v Myriad
Genetics, Inc (D’Arcy) was handed down by the High Court.
The challenge to Patent 686,004 was directed to three disputed claims (of the 30
total in the patent), which included claims to isolated gDNA, and cDNA coding for
identified mutations or polymorphisms.121 Unlike theMyriad decision, the Australian
courts were not required to consider claims relating to methods of diagnosis, whether
methods of comparingDNAsequences against thosewith knownmutations, or screen-
ing tests.122 Prior to D’Arcy, the patentability of isolated DNA sequences in Australia
had not been called into question.The practice of the Australian Patent Office was that
isolating DNA sequences from their natural environment was enough to make them
patentable subject matter.
The Australian courts in D’Arcy were required to consider whether the claims con-
stituted patentable subjectmatter or, specifically, amanner ofmanufacture, as required
by s 18(1) of the Patents Act 1990.This provides a threshold requirement: an invention
must be a ‘manner of manufacture’ within the meaning of s 6 of the Statute of Monop-
olies 1623. The Australian Patents Act 1990 is one of very few patent statutes to retain
this requirement from the first patent statute in the common law. Its inclusion signifies
broad judicial discretion to determine whether an invention is within the bounds of
patentable subject matter. Prior toD’Arcy, the High Court stated inNational Research
Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (NRDC), 123 the seminal case deal-
ing with the manner of manufacture requirement, that it does not qualify for precise
formulation. Rather, the relevant question is: ‘Is this a proper subject of letters patent
according to the principles which have been developed for the application of s 6 of the
Statute ofMonopolies?’124 InNRDC,TheHigh Court held that on the facts of the case
this requirement was satisfied because the subject matter in issue was (1) an artificially
created state of affairs that (2)had economic utility.125This two-limbed test becameen-
trenched as the accepted test for patentability under Australian law, attaining, as some
commentators have argued, the status of a rigidly applied ‘rule’.126
At first instance, Justice Nicholas127 in the Federal Court of Australia upheld the
validity of the disputed claims. His Honor found that the claims in question were to
isolated nucleic acids (gDNA), and that this isolated gDNA and its counterpart cDNA
were structurally different to naturally occurring sequences.128 There was no require-
ment for any change in chemical composition of the isolated sequences, rather, the fact
121 The challenged claims also included claims to ribonucleic acid (RNA), a molecule similar to DNA in that the
sequence of nucleotides sends instructions to the organism. RNA is, however, single-stranded.
122 The reason why methods of diagnosis were not challenged in the Australian litigation is unclear.
123 National Research Development Corporation v. Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252. Note that
s 18(2) of the Patents Act 1990 excludes form patentability ‘Human Beings, and the biological processes for
their generation’.The patentability of the invention inD’Arcywas not contested on the basis of this exclusion.
124 Id. at 269.
125 Id. at 278–79.
126 Ann L. Monotti,The Scope of “Manner of Manufacture” Under the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) After Grant v Com-
missioner of Patents, 34 FEDERAL L. REV. 461, 465 (2006)
127 Noting that in Australia all members of the judiciary are referred to as ‘Justices’ and ‘their Honours’.
128 Cancer Voices v. Myriad Genetics Inc [2013] FCA 65, [108].
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of their isolation was sufficient to create an artificially created state of affairs.129 The
second limb, that of economic utility, was not in issue.
On appeal, the Full Federal Court upheld Justice Nicholson’s decision. Justices
Dowsett, Kenny, Bennett, and Middleton held that the isolated product was not only
structurally different, but also functionally different to the naturally occurring prod-
uct.130 In other words, the Full Federal Court took a slightly different approach from
that of Justice Nicholson in finding that the isolated sequence did in fact differ to the
naturally occurring sequence.131 In this respect, the Full Federal Court was influenced
by the judgments of Judges Moore and Lourie in the US series of cases.132
Yvonne D’Arcy was granted special leave to appeal to the High Court. Although
unanimously holding that the claims in question did not fall within the concept of
patentable subject matter, the High Court gave three separate judgments. Most rel-
evant for present purposes is the judgment of the plurality, Chief Justice French and
Justices Kiefel, Bell, and Keane. The plurality returned attention to the NRDC formu-
lation, reiterating that it is not a rigid test.133 They confirmed that, in many instances,
the two-limb test will suffice to determine whether an invention satisfies the manner of
manufacture requirement, but where claims fall outside the established boundaries of
subject matter, it becomes necessary to turn to a range of other factors as well.134
In the case of isolated DNA sequences, the plurality concluded that the two-limb
test was not satisfied in that there was no ‘artificially created state of affairs’ as required
by the first limb.135Thebasis of the plurality’s findingwas that the sequence claimswere
to information.136 Although there were chemical, structural, and functional differences
in the isolated (as compared with the natural) sequences, it was the information stored
in them that was the essential element of the invention as claimed.The claims relied in
no way on the changes in chemical composition resulting from isolation;137 thus, there
was nothing ‘artificially created’.138 In the words of the plurality, the information was
‘discerned’ not ‘made’.139
Because the claimed invention fell into what it regarded as a new class of subject
matter, the plurality expounded a nonexhaustive list of factors to be taken into consid-
eration:
1. whether patentability would be consistent with the purposes of the Act and, in
particular:
1.1 whether the invention as claimed, if patentable under s 18(1)(a) could
give rise to a large new field ofmonopoly protectionwith potentially neg-
ative effects on innovation;
129 Id.
130 D’Arcy v. Myriad Genetics Inc [2014] 224 FCR 479, [212].
131 Id. at [213].
132 Id. at [217].
133 D’Arcy v. Myriad Genetics Inc [2015] HCA 35, [28].
134 Id.
135 Id. at [90].
136 Id. at [89]-[90].
137 Id.
138 Id. at [91].
139 Id. at [6].
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1.2 whether the invention as claimed if patentable under s 18(1)(a) could,
because of the content of the claims, have a chilling effect on activities
beyond those formally the subject of the exclusive rights granted to the
patentee;
1.3 whether to accordpatentability to the invention as claimedwould involve
the court in assessing important and conflicting public and private inter-
ests and purposes;
2. whether to accord patentability to the invention as claimed would enhance or
detract from the coherence of the law relating to inherent patentability;
3. relevance to Australia’s place in the international community of nations:
3.1 Australia’s obligations under international law;
3.2 the patent laws of other countries; and
4. whether to accord patentability to the class of invention as claimed would in-
volve law-making of a kind which should be done by legislature.140
Of these factors, the plurality considered 3, 4, and 6 to be of primary importance.141
As noted, theirHonors had already found that the claimswere to information andwere
therefore notmade, but they also considered the other enunciated factors.They placed
particular importance on the fact that allowing the patent could have a chilling effect on
innovation, given the odd consequence that ‘. . . the patent could be infringed without
the infringer being aware of that fact’ and the significant, unquantified size of the class
of isolated sequences.142Theplurality reached the same conclusion in respect of cDNA
which bears the same characteristics as gDNA in that it ‘. . . is synthesized but replicates
a naturally occurring sequence of events’.143
II.B. PatentOffice Practice Post-D’Arcy
From the outset, the repercussions of the D’Arcy decision were simultaneously wel-
comed,144 derided, and hotly debated.145 Shortly after the decision was handed down,
IP Australia (which houses the Australian Patent Office) issued a draft Examination
Practice.146 After a period of public consultation and deliberation, changes to the
140 Id. at [28].
141 Id.
142 Id. at [93].
143 Id. at [89].
144 See eg Sumer Dayal & Sadat Cheema, So – What’s Next? Divining the Future of Gene Patenting, 110 INTELL.
PROP. FORUM 32 (2017); LucasMcCallum&Thomas Faunce,Myriad Voices Against Gene Patents in the High
Court, 23 J. L. &MED. 322 (2015).
145 See eg Charles Lawson, Patenting Nucleic Acid Sequences: More Ambiguity from the High Court?, 25 J. L. &
MED. 741 (2018); Matthew Rimmer, An Exorbitant Monopoly: The High Court of Australia, Myriad Genetics,
And Gene Patents, in RESEARCHHANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE LIFE SCIENCES 56 (Duncan
Matthews &Herbert Zech eds, Edward Elgar 2016); Peter McFarlane & Betty Kontoleon, Some Legal Issues
Regarding the Patenting of Human Genetic Material, 24 J. L. & MED. 181 (2016); William Bartlett, D’Arcy v
Myriad Genetics Inc [2015] HCA 35: The Plurality’s New Factorial Approach to Patentability Rearticulates
the Question Asked in NRDC, 24(1) Journal of Information, Law and Science 1 (2016); Jessica Lai, Gene-
Related Patents in Australia and New Zealand: Taking a Step Back, 25 AUSTL. INTELL. PROP. J. 181 (2015).
146 IP Australia, Consultation examination practice D’Arcy v Myriad Genetics Inc (undated)
https://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/about-us/public-consultations/consultation-examination-practice-darcy-v-
myriad-genetics-inc (accessed Sept. 12, 2018).
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Manual of Practice and Procedure were implemented.147 The resulting Practice Note
states that isolated nucleic acid sequences (gDNA) are not patent-eligible subject
matter.148 It also precludes from patent-eligibility cDNA and synthetic nucleotide se-
quences, probes, and primers and isolated interfering/inhibitory nucleotide sequences
that merely replicate genetic information of naturally occurring organisms.149 This as-
pect of the Practice Note relies on the plurality’s judgment that any full or partial se-
quence that replicates a naturally occurring sequence constitutes information and is
not patentable.150 The potential breadth of this finding by the High Court has been
disputed: for example, some commentators have asserted the High Court’s finding
should be interpreted narrowly, rendering cDNA sequences ineligible only where a
corresponding claim to gDNA would be ineligible.151 However, the Practice Note ap-
pears to interpret it more broadly and preclude any DNA sequence from patentability
where it replicates a naturally occurring sequence.
A number of PatentOffice decisions have provided the potential to consider the im-
port of the PracticeNote (andD’Arcy itself) in the context of sequence information.152
Although none of them has been particularly illuminating, taken together they suggest
that, in practice, IP Australia is interpreting the impact of the D’Arcy case cautiously.
In Cargill Incorporated v Dow Agro Sciences LLC,153 the patent eligibility of a fungal
sequence was confirmed on the basis that the inventors had codon-optimized the se-
quence, differentiating it from the naturally occurring sequence.154 According to the
decision-maker in this matter (a Delegate of the Commissioner of Patents), this sub-
ject matter was not near the boundaries of patentability and thus did not invoke con-
sideration of the additional D’Arcy factors.155 A similar result was reached in CSIRO
v BASF.156 In Arrowhead Research Corporation,157 the generation of target RNA se-
quences was found by the Delegate to be an important element of the claimed inven-
tion, but not the substance of the invention. Instead, the substance of the invention
was a pharmaceutical composition comprising interfering RNA because the particular
nucleotide sequences claimedwere not critical to the invention, rather the capacity pro-
vided by the invention to identify specific target sequences was.158
147 Australian Patent Office, Manual of Practice and Procedure, 2.9.2.6 Nucleic Acids and Genetic Informa-
tion, http://manuals.ipaustralia.gov.au/patents/national/patentable/2.9.2.6 Nucleic acids and genetic
information.htm (accessed Sept. 12, 2018).
148 Australian Patent Office, Examination Practice Following the High Court Decision in D’Arcy v Myriad Ge-
netics Inc., https://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/about-us/news-and-community/news/examination-practice-
following-high-court-decision-darcy-v-myriad (accessed Sept. 12, 2018) [hereinafter Practice Note].
149 Id. at 3.
150 D’Arcy v. Myriad Genetics Inc (2014) 224 FCR 479, [89].
151 Mark Summerfield, Proposed Australian Examination Practice Gives Narrow Interpretation to High
Court’s Myriad’s Ruling, Patentology.com.au, Oct. 18, 2015, http://blog.patentology.com.au/2015/
10/proposed-australian-examination.html (accessed Sept. 12, 2018).
152 It should be noted that the Australian Patent Office hears first instance pre-grant oppositions and re-
examination requests. Appeals for re-hearings can be made to the Federal Court of Australia.
153 Cargill Incorporated v. Dow Agro Sciences LLC (2016) APO 43 (5 July 2016).
154 Id. at [41].
155 Id. at [47].
156 CSIRO v. BASF [2016] APO 83 (23 November 2016) [55]–[66].
157 Arrowhead Research Corporation [2016] APO 70 (Oct. 13, 2016).
158 Id. at [19]–[29].
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Finally, inSunPharmaceuticals vTasmanianAlkaloids,159 the relevant patent claimed
the mutagenesis of poppy seeds and screening of progeny plants to produce pop-
pies with a higher output of codeine (over other alkaloids). The Patent Office Dele-
gate found no evidence that a mutation producing levels of codeine in line with those
claimed in the patent had or would be naturally occurring. Hence, there was no ground
to oppose the patent on the basis that the subject matter was naturally occurring (as it
was found to be inD’Arcy).160 On the face of it, these decisions suggest theD’Arcy de-
cision has had limited impact on Patent Office practice in relation to determining the
patentability of DNA sequences.
The application of theD’Arcy test to new classes of claim is discussed more broadly
in the Practice Note, which states that the factorial test must only be applied to new
classes of claim ‘. . . involving a significant new application or extension of the principles
of patentability. . . ’.161 Claims relating to technical subject matter that has previously
been considered by the courts and not rejected are to be assessed according to the ‘. . .
normal requirements . . . ’ as laid down inNRDC.162 Subject matter that falls into estab-
lished categories of patent eligibility is stated in the Practice Note to include recom-
binant or isolated proteins, pharmaceuticals and other chemical substances, methods
of treatment, methods of applying herbicides, and applications of computer technol-
ogy.163 These are all categories of subject matter that have been considered by the Aus-
tralian courts to be patent-eligible.What this indicates is that it is likely that the factorial
approach will only be applied in the rarest of circumstances, for significant new innova-
tions.While the lower courts couldderive some real benefit from the guidanceprovided
by the High Court in terms of the range of factors to consider in such circumstances, it
is disappointing that their opportunities to do so will be so limited. It is even more dis-
appointing that when opportunities have arisen on the boundaries of patent eligibility,
there has been some reluctance to engage with them.
The applicability of D’Arcy was considered in several subsequent cases involving
product claims, although theD’Arcy factors were not invoked because in each of these
cases the court found that the claims did not fall within a new class of claim.164 This ap-
parent unwillingness on the part of the judiciary to engage with the D’Arcy factors has
led some commentators to question the High Court’s approach in D’Arcy, and assert
that it had introduced uncertainty into Australian patent law.165 For example, Charles
Lawson contends that the plurality’s finding that there was nothing ‘made’ by Myriad
suggests that the plurality decided the case on the existing NRDC principles, and that
their subsequent exposition of the factorial approachmay not be binding.166 While de-
ceptively alluring, this argument overlooks the fact that the plurality did not rule out
159 Sun Pharmaceuticals Industries (Australia) Pty Ltd v. Tasmanian Alkaloids Pty Ltd [2018] APO 7 (Jan. 31,
2018).
160 Id. at [69]–[71].
161 Practice Note, supra note 148, at 3.
162 Id. at 1.
163 Id. at 2.
164 Commissioner of Patents v. RPLCentral Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 177 [119] (implemented business method
claim);GileadSciencesPtyLtd v. IdenixPharmaceuticals LLC[2016]FCA169chemical andpharmaceutical
compounds).
165 See eg Lawson, supra note 145; Lai, supra note 145, at 193.
166 Lawson, supra note 145, at 749–50.
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the possibility that information encoded inDNAmight be patentable. In this caseMyr-
iad failed to establish patentability, but in cases where a finding of patentability remains
open, a finding that a newclass of claim is implicated is likely, andpresumably, the facto-
rial approachwould thenbe applied.The fundamental fact is thatD’Arcydid not change
the law as laid down in NRDC, but merely affirmed the correctness of the NRDC ap-
proach to areas of technology within the established boundaries of patentability. The
plurality’s factorial approach effectively legitimizes the approach Australian courts had
implicitly taken with respect to determining questions of patentability in areas of new
technology. To this extent, it arguably remains the case thatD’Arcy is not inconsistent
with its predecessor decisions, which sanctioned the plurality’s approach in any event.
It is also evident that the evolution of themanner ofmanufacture test is an ongoing pro-
cess, and that jurists can invariably expect to be confrontedwith further caseswhichwill
explore the bounds of theD’Arcy decision.
II.C. Australia’sMayoMoment?ThePatentability ofDiagnostic TestingMethods
andMeat and Livestock Australia v Cargill
Unlike the Supreme Court in Mayo, the Australian High Court has not yet been
given the opportunity to engage with the question of whether methods of diagnostic
testing are patentable. This is significant given the potential impact of theD’Arcy prin-
ciples on the diagnostic testing industry and the biotechnology industry more broadly.
It has been recognized that diagnosticmethod claims are capable of producing a greater
blocking effect on diagnostic testing than nucleotide sequence claims.167
But Australia does appear to be having itsMayo moment.Meat and Livestock Aus-
tralia v Cargill (Cargill)168 involved a series of method claims for identifying bovine
traits from nucleic acid samples using SNPs (single nucleotide polymorphisms, vari-
ants of specific nucleotides) for ‘managing, selecting, breeding and cloning cattle’.169
Patent application number 2,010,202,253, entitled ‘Compositions, Methods and Sys-
tems for Inferring Bovine Traits’, was filed by Banhaven LLC and Cargill Inc.170 Meat
and Livestock Australia (MLA) brought an action under Australia’s pre-grant opposi-
tion procedure to challenge the claims on several grounds. These included the argu-
ment that the claims failed to satisfy the manner of manufacture test,171 in that they
were drawn to include knownmethods of identifying bovine traits, and involved DNA
sequences that were either not identified or were yet to be identified. In addition, be-
cause the inventors created a high-density map of the bovine genome using variants of
specific SNPs and associations that were naturally occurring, MLA asserted a lack of
167 Isabelle Huys et al., Legal Uncertainty in the Area of Genetic Diagnostic Testing, 27 NAT. BIOTECHNOL. 903
(2009).
168 Meat and Livestock Ltd v. Cargill Inc [2018] FCA 51.
169 Id. at [147].
170 The patent was filed on June 1, 2010 but has a priority date of Dec. 31, 2002 claimed on the basis of an earlier
parent application.
171 Although an appeal from a decision of the Patent Office, the hearing was conducted de novo with the result
that a number of grounds of opposition not considered in the earlier hearing were considered by Beach J in
the Federal Court.
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patentable subject matter on the basis that there was nothing man-made or artificially
occurring.172
The case was heard by Justice Jonathan Beach, who brings with him a tertiary edu-
cation in physical chemistry as well as experience from the bar in intellectual property
litigation. As observed by Justice Beach, there was some indication in the judgment of
the plurality inD’Arcy that because they were not addressing method claims, by impli-
cation such claims might be more readily viewed as being within the existing bound-
aries of patentable subject matter.173 Some methods of medical treatment have been
considered patentable in Australia; a new method of using a known drug was held by
the High Court (by majority) in Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd to
fulfill the manner of manufacture requirement.174 That case did not, however, address
the question of whether physical, as opposed to chemical, methods of medical treat-
ment are patentable, or broader questions of whether methods of diagnosis satisfy the
manner of manufacture requirement. It also offered little assistance on the question at
issue in Cargill, which involved broad methods of identifying bovine traits.
Justice Beach inCargill distinguishedD’Arcy on a number of grounds, primarily that
the claims inCargillwere not purely to naturally occurring genetic information, as were
the claims in question inD’Arcy.175 Justice Beach considered the claims inCargill to be
‘within the plain vanilla concept of manner of manufacture as outlined in NRDC and
Myriad’ rather than a new class of claim.176 He rejected an argument that the claims
in issue involved simply the practical application of a naturally occurring phenomenon
to a particular use.177 Instead, what was claimed involved the taking of a sample and
analysing the sample to identify SNPs associatedwith particular traits of interest, which
was sufficient, in hisHonor’s view, to give rise to an artificially created state of affairs.178
Although Justice Beach was unequivocal in concluding that the claims in Cargill
were not at the boundaries of patentable subjectmatter, he went on (seemingly with an
eye to the likelihood of an appeal on the decision) to consider how the D’Arcy factors
would apply in the event that the opposite were true. In applying theD’Arcy factors, he
rejected an assertion that upholding patentability in Cargill would render the decision
inconsistentwithD’Arcy, reiterating his opinion that the claims inCargillwere tometh-
ods applying information rather than claims to information per se.179 Further he found
no lack of coherency with foreign law in that US law accepts that a method involving
the application of a law of nature is patentable, as it is in Australia.
172 The appeal was founded on a number of further grounds, none of which are directly relevant in the context of
this paper: see Meat and Livestock Ltd v. Cargill Inc [2018] FCA 51, at [151]–[152].
173 Id. at [409]. Indeed, in theHighCourt decision inD’Arcy, Gageler andNettle JJ, in a judgment separate to that
of the plurality, acknowledged that a process of using a known technology to isolate a nucleotide sequence
and use it to detect or predict malignancy, might be patentable: D’Arcy v. Myriad Genetics Inc [2015] HCA
35 [147], [168].
174 Apotex Pty Ltd v. Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd [2013]HCA 50 (Dec. 4, 2013).This finding was based on
the fact that pharmaceutical products are patentable, and to exclude treatments using such products would
produce an anomaly. For an explanation, see the judgment of the plurality in D’Arcy v. Myriad Genetics Inc
[2015] HCA 35, [28].
175 Meat and Livestock Ltd v. Cargill Inc [2018] FCA 51, at [425]–[433].
176 Id. at [428].
177 Id. at [455].
178 Id. at [455].
179 Id. at [487].
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Cargill did not involve an assessment of the applicability (or otherwise) ofMayo. In-
deed, the judge found ‘[t]he exposition of the test (particularly the second stage (‘ap-
ply it’) inMayo is too sweeping for [him] to work out whether [he was] acting consis-
tently or inconsistently with its spirit’180 when determining what it takes to transform
an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application.181 And he found him-
self unable to undertake a comprehensive assessment of coherence with foreign laws
by considering only ‘cherry-picked jurisprudence from one jurisdiction’ (the United
States).182 Finally, Justice Beach rejected an assertion that the ‘exorbitant’ breadth of
theCargill claims would likely have a substantial chilling effect on innovation.183 Find-
ing no evidence to support the assertion, he pointed out that the breadth of claims alone
would not defeat a claim to patentable subjectmatter, and that this issue ismore appro-
priately dealt with under other parameters of patentability. On this point, he found that
the claimswere not only too broad, but also lacked clarity andwere poorly defined, and
on this basis he instructed the parties to amend the patent application.184
It seems a foregone conclusion that the decisionwill be appealed. It is not difficult to
envisage the grounds of appeal focusing on whether the claims in the case can truly be
dealt with as methods, despite the characterization of them as such. Even if the claims
are appropriately classified asmethod claims, there is a real question as to whether they
involve more than the discovery of associations with naturally occurring traits. On this
basis, we should expect to see further jurisprudence dealing with this vexed question in
the not too distant future.185
As a final point, it is worth noting comments made by Justice Beach in relation to
the High Court’s factorial approach:
Now various questions might be said to suggest themselves concerning the ‘other fac-
tors’ approach. First, is this a policy-driven approach to the assessment of patentability
for cases on or beyond the existing boundaries? Second, is this approach properly charac-
terised as purposive or consequentialist or both?Third, is there a clear threshold to justify
moving into such a space, and if so, what? In some cases reasonable minds might differ
as to whether a case is within or without existing boundaries. Fourth, has the plurality
just beenmore transparent about the considerations to be taken into account in assessing
whether new or difficult subject matter is a proper subject matter for the grant of letters
patent. Fifth and further, various issues concerning the priority ranking and weighting to
be given to these factors remain to be explored. . . . And am I obliged to consider all of the
factors or only some of them?
180 Id. at [492].
181 Id. at [492].
182 Id. at [490].
183 Id. at [496]
184 Id. at [265–26] and [500].
185 Note also the matter of Sequenom Inc v. Ariosa Diagnostics Inc & Ors (File No VID611/2016) is at pre-
hearing stage in Australia, with the first instance hearing before Justice Beach scheduled for August 2018.
While it is difficult to predict the outcome of the hearing in this paper, it is possible to speculate that Justice
Beach will apply the factorial approach if he considers it applicable – depending on his interpretation of the
patent claims.
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II.D. Lessons forUS Practice
While it may well be true that the decision in Cargill will be reviewed by higher Aus-
tralian courts and modified (if not reversed), Justice Beach’s interpretation of D’Arcy,
coupled with the guidelines set out by IP Australia, offers one intuitive way forward
in dealing with the problems identified earlier in the aftermath of the US decisions in
Mayo andMyriad.This approach furnishes an analytical technique that avoids the prob-
lems in the two-stepMayo test of determining when a difference is marked, deciding
what constitutes significantly more, and finding an inventive concept. In contrast to a
recent decision of theUS Patent Trial and Appeal Board, which invalidated a patent on
a method for using SNPs to breed cows,186 Justice Beach managed, even after D’Arcy,
to retain the availability of patents to encourage valuable new inventions in the life sci-
ences arena, in this case, one with potential to improve nutrition. He did so in three
ways.
First, he regarded invention in traditional (‘plain vanilla’) subject areas—places
where society has not heretofore experienced significant difficulty with patent
rights—as the proper subject matter of patenting. To deal with the abstractness prob-
lem that concerned theSupremeCourt inAlice and thebreadth issue thatworried Judge
Bryson inMyriad—claims which, as the D’Arcy Court put it, one could inadvertently
infringe—he deployed other patentability requirements. In US parlance, he required
the applicant to supply more information under the rubrics of enablement and distinct
claiming.187 Of course, it remains to be seen whether the patent retains value once the
applicant makes the required amendments.
Second, to the extent JusticeBeach sawhimself as dealingwith an areawhere patent-
ing is new—areas where early insights are likely to be fundamental and where rights
could, in Justice Breyer’s words, impede rather than promote progress—Justice Beach
considered the factorial test. He was able to use this approach to look directly at the
problem of chilling future innovation instead of, as in CellzDirect, peeking at preemp-
tion after struggling with a test that is difficult to apply, not well correlated with the
concern, and easily influenced by how a claim is drafted. Thus, while we take Profes-
sor Lawson’s point that, once theD’Arcy court decided genes were not man-made, the
factorial test might be considered dictum, we see it as a way to deal with modern tech-
nologies that lie close to fundamental scientific principles (so called dual-use technolo-
gies) or with the sort of inventions that Dan Burk has identified as troubling because
they are communicative in nature.188 The factorial test draws attention to the concerns
attendant to patenting in these areas and requires courts (and patent offices) to en-
gage with the social and proprietary implications of either granting or denying exclu-
sive rights. (As we will argue later, identifying these borderline cases can also be useful
to determine the scope of defenses, should the patent be enforced.) In some ways this
approach is similar to the suggestion made by Dennis Crouch and Robert Merges that
186 American Simmental Assoc. v. Leachman Cattle, 2016WL 3268597 (Patent Tr. & App. Bd. June 13, 2016).
187 35 U.S.C § 112 (2018). In some cases, the written description requirement could serve a similar function.
188 Dan L. Burk, Patents and the First Amendment, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. (2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=3119362 (accessed Sept. 12, 2018), at 17. Burk
regards such inventions are raising First Amendment concerns, but his examples mainly demonstrate the
sort of innovation and competition problems that lie at the heart of the subject matter objection.
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subject matter eligibility should be considered only after other criteria for patentability
are evaluated.189
Third, Justice Beach appreciated the difference between attempts to privatize pure
communicative material (or as the courts call it, information),190 by claiming the
medium in which it is embedded, as opposed to a concrete implementation of that
material in a way that can improve social welfare. This is illustrated by the way that
he dealt with the two product claims in issue in Cargill, a claim to an isolated DNA
sequence (claim 13) and a claim to a cloned bovine (claim 11), both resulting from
methods also claimed in the patent. The sequence claim was rejected as within the bar
created by D’Arcy.191 In contrast, Justice Beach found the claim to the cloned animal
to be patentable subject matter. He did not stop with the similarities between the clone
and itsmother, as theFederalCircuit did inRoslin, nor didhe attempt todecidewhether
differences in epigenetics or mitochondria were marked or significant enough. Instead
he reasoned:
Now of course the cloned cow in one sense is the same as that which it clones. MLA
says superficially that it is ‘mere genetic information on a grander scale’ and accordingly
Myriad is directly applicable. The submission has a superficial allure, but I reject it. An
artificial object of economic significance is produced for its own sake, not merely as a re-
ceptacle for its informational content.192
To be sure, much as this approach presents a valuable way to preserve patentabil-
ity in areas where incentives are important and concerns around exclusivity are not
paramount, it would be somewhat difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court’s pro-
nouncements. But as noted earlier, the distinction Justice Thomas drew inMyriad be-
tweenman-made and artificial is not as sharp as hemaintained. As Judge Lourie argued,
isolated gDNA involves broken bonds and is thus somewhat artificial (especially when
the claimed fragments possess the sorts of functions Judge Moore described). At the
same time, when it is only the exons (coding sequences) that matter, cDNA cannot be
consideredman-made. In short, supplementary factors will always be necessary to sep-
arate patentable and unpatentable subject matter—arguably, that is why the PTO, the
FederalCircuit, and theAliceCourt ignored theMyriadCourt’s failure to citeMayo and
instead have relied on its two-step analysis for all subject matter challenges. The fac-
tors used in the Australian decisions can be regarded as providing the missing metric
for deciding what is different enough from nature to be considered protectable. And,
as Crouch and Merges and many commentators have pointed out, reliance on other
patentability factors—enablement, written description, distinct claiming, nonobvious-
ness, utility, and novelty—will often be enough to filter out subject matter that should
189 Crouch &Merges, supra note 21.
190 Wenote thatProfessorLawsondisputes the characterizationof genetic sequences as information, seeLawson,
supra note 145, especially at 758–60. However, the description of DNA he provides does not erase its role as
communicative, as directing complex processes that are critical to medical science.
191 Meat and Livestock Ltd v. Cargill Inc [2018] FCA 51 [409] [482] (noting that even though this claim was
different from those invalidated in D’Arcy because it was limited to sequences identified through a method
that was also claimed in the patent, allowing the claim would conflict with the themes ofMyriad).
192 Id. at [409] [470].
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not be patented.193 It would mark quite a shift in Australian jurisprudence, however, if
these supplementary factors are considered after the other patentability factors. Patent
eligibility has traditionally been considered to be a threshold question.
We may already be seeing the Federal Circuit move in a similar direction, one
more hospitable to patenting material drawn to nature. Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v
West-Ward Pharmaceuticals, Ltd. (Vanda), which was decided in April 2018, involved
a method for treating schizophrenia based on a patient’s genotype.194 A representative
claim included a step to determine (or have determined) the patient’s genotype from a
biological sample, and then administering an amount of iloperidone that is dependent
on whether the patient is genetically inclined to be a poor metabolizer. The method
is based on the natural relationship between the P450 2D6 gene and an enzyme that
is known tometabolize many drugs, including iloperidone. Nevertheless, the court did
not reject thepatent as a lawofnature, barredbyMayo. Instead, like JusticeBeach, Judge
Lourie confinedMayo to its facts. Since theMayo claims ‘were not directed to a novel
methodof treating adisease’, heheld thatVanda ‘is notMayo’. 195That said, as inCargill,
the court went on to consider theMayo factors and found the claimwas patent-eligible
under Step 1 (the PTO’s 2A).196 In addition, it determined that the claim was not pre-
emptive because it did not tie up subsequent treatment decisions.197 Tellingly, Judge
Prost’s dissent called attention to the ways in which the decision departs from Mayo
and the court’s former understanding of how it applies.198 But this approach has the
advantage of opening opportunities to patent in areas that hold considerable promise,
including as in this case, personalized medicine.
III. CONSEQUENCES OF EXPANDING THE REACH OF PATENTABLE
SUBJECT MATTER
TheUS patent community has not reacted to the subject-matter eligibility cases in the
sameway as Justice Beach did by advocating for amore refined and nuanced analysis of
the distinction between eligibility and noneligibility. While USPTO Director Andrei
Iancu noted the difficulties in applying current law and concluded that ‘[s]omething
must be done’,199 the bar appears to have little patience with improving the defini-
tions of ‘markedly different’ and ‘significantly more’ or with leavening the analysis with
technical filters, as in In Re Fisher,200 or relying more on the nonobviousness inquiry
193 See egCrouch&Merges, supranote 21 and thediscussion in JohnM.Golden,Redundancy:WhenLawRepeats
Itself, 94 TEX. L. REV. 629, 701–03 (2016). Further, as Paul Gugliuzza notes, the idea that subject matter
eligibility must be decided first introduces new sources of error, see Gugliuzza, supra note 21.
194 87 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
195 Id. at 1134.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 1135.
198 Id. at 1140–43 (Prost, J., dissenting).
199 Specifically, he noted that: [C]urrent standards [of subject matter eligibility] are difficult for all: stake-
holders, courts, examiners, practitioners, and investors alike. System-wide, a significant amount of time
is being spent trying to figure out where the lines should be drawn, and what’s in and what’s out. And
multiple people looking at the same patent claims often have trouble agreeing on, and predicting, the out-
come. Dennis Crouch, UPTO Director Andrei Iancu on Patent Policy, PATENTLYO BLOG, Apr. 11, 2018,
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/04/director-andrei-patent.html (accessed Sept. 12, 2018).
200 421 F.3d 1365 (2005).
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set out in KSR International Co. v Teleflex, Inc.201 Instead, the consensus seems to be
that the ‘something’ must be a dramatic expansion of patentable subject matter. As we
saw earlier, various influential organizations such as the IPO, the AIPLA, and the ABA
have recommended that Congress amend the Patent Act to vastly expand the scope of
patentable subject matter.202
Should that occur, the question arises as to what will happen to the concerns voiced
in the Supreme Court subject matter cases and, almost more important, the patient
access problems that animated the Myriad case in the first place. Immediately after
Myriad, patient access to BRCA diagnostics improved rapidly. Two firms (Ambry and
Gene-by-Gene) immediately entered the market and lowered costs. Thereafter, other,
more efficient, forms of testing (such as testing of multiple genes simultaneously) were
made available.203 Surely, the goal cannot be to roll back the potential for these devel-
opments. Rather, we argue that Justice Breyer’s admonition that ‘sometimes toomuch
patent protection can impede rather than ‘promote the Progress of Science,” should
be understood in the context in which it was made, as a reaction to cases limiting the
scope of the experimental use defense.204 Thus, it should be interpreted not as advo-
cating fewer patents (the upshot of Myriad and Mayo), but rather as suggesting that
the protection offered by a patent should be tempered by defenses that promote other
values. Prior toMyriad, SACGHS had recommended the creation of exemptions from
patent infringement for use of genetic tests for patient care purposes and for use of
patent-protected DNA sequences for research purposes.205 Although the America In-
vents Act of 2011 did not include these proposals, it did expressly require the Director
of the Patent andTrademarksOffice to conduct a study into second opinion testing.206
The Report advised caution and made recommendations concerning data sharing and
testing.207 However, in light of the Supreme Court subject matter decisions, the study
became largely irrelevant. But should the legislature overrule these cases, it must also
consider changes along the lines recommended by SACGHS. Once again, the United
States can learn a great deal from Australia.
III.A. Australian Practice
As noted above, GTG had taken steps in 2003 and 2008 to assert the BRCA patents
against public laboratories and research bodies that were performing BRCA testing.208
However, it was not the decision in D’Arcy that altered its behavior. Rather—perhaps
surprisingly—it voluntarily ceased its enforcement actions. Partly, it seems that GTG
201 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
202 See text at notes 18–19, supra.
203 See FORCE, Myriad Genetics vs. Ambry and Gene-by-Gene (2015), http://www.facingourrisk.org/
our-role-and-impact/advocacy/current-actions/myriad-ambry.php(accessedSept. 12, 2018);RobertCook-
Deegan & Annie Niehaus, After Myriad: Genetic Testing in the Wake of Recent Supreme Court Decisions about
Gene Patents, 2 CURR.GENET.MED. REP. 223 (2014); In re BRCA1-&BRCA2-BasedHereditary Cancer Test
Patent Litig., 774 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2014)(refusing to enjoin other laboratories offering BRCA testing).
204 See text at notes 57–60, supra.
205 SACGHS Report, supra note 2, at 89, 94–95.
206 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), §27.
207 United States Patent and Trademark Office, Report on Confirmatory Diagnostic Test Activity (2015),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTO Report on Confirmatory Genetic
DiagnosticTest Activity.pdf (accessed Sept. 12, 2018).
208 See text at notes 120–143 supra, Part II A.
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was reacting to negative public reactions209 but there was probably more to it than
this. A recent empirical study conducted by two of the authors suggests that the unique
structure of the Australian genetic diagnostic sector might have played a role in GTG’s
decision to drop the suit.210
As this study reports, traditionally, genetic testing in Australia has been conducted
by nationally accredited public pathology laboratories, although several private labo-
ratories have always operated. The public labs mainly serve patients eligible for pub-
lic funding. These are patients who meet an appropriate risk profile for a particular
genetic condition.They are not expected tomake any personal payment; instead, fund-
ing for their testing is provided by state-based healthcare systems and, to a lesser ex-
tent throughAustralia’s federal-government-fundedMedicareBenefits Scheme.211The
conduit between public laboratories and patients is clinical genetic testing services
based in each Australian state, which are tasked with genetic counseling and referring
patients for testing.212
While public laboratoriesmainly serve eligible patients and private labs serve private
patients, the separation is not perfect. Public laboratoriesmay alsoperform tests for self-
funded, private patients (patients who do not meet the eligibility requirements), many
of whom are referred through the clinical genetic testing services.213 At the same time,
there are patients referred for genetic testing through the public system who may sub-
sequently be referred on to private laboratories. Prices charged for the tests are gener-
ally low. Public laboratories make up a very significant proportion of the market for ge-
netic diagnostic tests in Australia (indeed, at the time GTG contemplated asserting its
patents, it was the only private lab in Australia offering BRCA testing); most tests per-
formed are, in fact, publicly funded.214 Since government-funded health care is based
largely on recovering costs,215 excessive test prices are unsustainable.216
The result is a structure that largely protects Australian public laboratories from en-
forcement actions.217 For themost part, prices cannot risemore than the government is
209 Upon reviewing its decision to assert its patents in 2003, GTG stated that its rights over the BRCA genes
‘are our gift to the Australian people’, Genetic Technologies Ltd, Report to shareholders (July 9, 2003), at 1;
Genetic Technologies Ltd, New Position re BRCA Testing (Dec. 2, 2008), at 1, no longer publicly available
but reported inDianneNicol,Navigating theMolecularDiagnostic Patent Landscape, 18 EXPERTOPIN.THERAP.
PATENTS 461, 466 (2008), https://eprints.utas.edu.au/7224/ (accessed Sept. 12, 2018).
210 Jane Nielsen & Dianne Nicol, The Myriad Litigation and Genetic Diagnostic Testing in Australia (2018)
(manuscript submitted for publication); Nicol, Nielsen and Dawkins, The Impact of the High Court’s De-
cision in D’Arcy vMyriad on the Cost of Genetic Testing in Australia (unpublished manuscript on file).
211 Australia’s federal government allocates funds to each Australian state for the provision of public health ser-
vices, these being largely operational services (hospitals and associated services). In addition, the federal gov-
ernment has responsibility for funding certain items, including medical services (through theMedicare Ben-
efits Scheme) and prescription pharmaceuticals (through the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme).
212 Nielsen &Nicol, supra note 210, at 5–7.
213 Royal College or Pathologists of Australasia, Report of the RCPA Genetic Testing Survey 2011, 21 (2012),
https://www.rcpa.edu.au/Library/Practising-Pathology/RCPA-Genetic-Testing/Docs/RCPA-Genetic-
Testing-Survey-Report.aspx (accessed Sept. 12, 2018). State governments reimbursed 39.2% of tests, the
MBS covered 34.1%, while private patients paid for 19.7% of tests conducted.
214 Nicol, Nielsen and Dawkins, supra note 210, at 32 (citing a figure of 73.3%).
215 Id. at 32–37.
216 Id. at 34–35, 56.
217 Nicol & Nielsen, supra note 210, at 7–8; Nicol, Nielsen and Dawkins, supra note 210, at 56; Dianne Nicol
& John Liddicoat, Do Patents Impede the Provision of Genetic Tests in Australia?, 37 AUSTL. HEALTH REV. 281
(2013).
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willing topay.Moreover,while thepublic laboratories are competitors of patentholders
likeGTG, they are also their customers, in that theydo thebulkof the genetic testing.218
Finally, patent holders know that the government can always send samples abroad for
testing. Indeed, in Australia there is an increasing reliance (albeit still small) on foreign
laboratories.219
There are other dynamics under Australian patent law that influence access to fun-
damental biomedical patents. Prior to April 16, 2012, when the Intellectual Property
Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2012 (Cth) (Raising the Bar Act) came into
effect, there was no express exemption from infringement for experimental use in the
Australian Patents Act 1990 and no judicial precedents indicating that such an exemp-
tion existed at common law.220 The Raising the Bar Act introduced a limited research
exemption into Australian law via s 119C of the Patents Act 1990.221 The research ex-
emption in s 119C protects a person from infringing a patent for an invention where
an act is done that would infringe a patent, provided it is done for experimental pur-
poses relating to the subject matter of the invention (often referred to as an exemption
for ‘research on’ the subject matter of the invention, as opposed to ‘research with’ this
subjectmatter).222 The stated intention of this provisionwas ‘. . . to give broad and clear
protection to research and experimental activities in order to maximise the potential
for research in Australia’.223 However, its scope and effect are yet to be clearly deter-
mined. It is particularly unclear as to how the exemption will apply to gene patents. It
is not intended to protect use of patented research tools.224 Nor would it cover diag-
nostic testing. Despite its limited reach in relation to ‘public good’ uses, it would, how-
ever, permit research about the functions the gene influences and how its expression is
controlled.
In an empirical study of patent practice in the Australian medical biotechnology in-
dustry undertaken in 2002–2003, two of the authors found that there was a de facto
research exemption from infringement, in the sense that owners of gene and other re-
search tool patents tended not to enforce their rights against research users.225 The
one reported exception to this norm related to the polymerase chain reaction patent.
These findings were largely affirmed in another empirical study by the authors and
218 Nielsen &Nicol, supra note 210, at 8; Nicol, Nielsen and Dawkins, supra note 210, at 55–58.
219 Nicol & Liddicoat, supra note 217, at 31–32.
220 Advisory Council on Intellectual Property (ACIP), Patents and Experimental Use, Final Report 65 (2005),
https://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/sites/g/files/net856/f/acip final report patents and experimental use
archived.pdf (accessed Sept. 12, 2018).
221 Patents Act 1990 s 119C, inserted by Intellectual Property LawsAmendment,Act 2012 (Cth) sch 2 pt 1 [here-
inafter Raising the Bar]: ‘A person may, without infringing a patent for an invention, do an act that would in-
fringe the patent apart from this subsection, if the act is done for experimental purposes relating to the subject
matter of the invention.’
222 Patents Act 1990.
223 Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Bill 2011, Explanatory Memorandum, The
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 9, https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/
C2011B00114/Explanatory%20Memorandum/Text (accessed Sept. 12, 2018).
224 Productivity Commission, Compulsory Licensing of Patents, Report No. 61, 184 (2013),
https://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/patents/report/patents.pdf (accessed Sept. 12, 2018).
225 Dianne Nicol & Jane Nielsen, Patents and Medical Biotechnology: An Empirical Analysis of Issues Facing
the Australian Industry 217-218 (Hobart: Centre for Law and Genetics Occasional Paper No. 6; 2003),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2583508 (accessed Sept. 12, 2018).
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others collaborators some ten years later.226 In the intervening period it became clear
that GTG was enforcing its patent rights, not in relation to the BRCA patents but
its own intron sequence analysis patent, with universities, commercial entities, and
providers of molecular diagnostic services in various jurisdictions.227 Noncommercial
research organizationswere offered research licenses for nominal, one-off fees, whereas
commercial licensees were required to pay significant fees for past infringement and fu-
ture use; indeed,GTGwas able to negotiate its exclusive licensewithMyriad on this ba-
sis.228 Thismay be another reason whyGTGdidn’t enforce its BRCA patent rights—it
didn’t need to because it could rely on its own intron sequence analysis patent. Ironi-
cally, in theUnited States, this patent was struck down by theU.S. Federal Circuit post-
Myriad for failing to satisfy the subject matter requirement.229
In addition to the experimental use exemption, Australian patent legislation also
includes provisions allowing for certain noninfringing uses of the patented invention
without the permission of the patentee, referred to internationally as uses without au-
thorization.230 Two main forms of use without authorization of the patentee exist in
Australia.231 First, a compulsory license is a court or administrative order requiring the
patentee to grant a license to a third party towork the invention. Secondly, government
use embraces use of the invention by the government for the purposes of the state.The
rationale for use without authorization is thought to go to the heart of the justification
for the patent system,which is to encourage innovationwhich has benefits for the econ-
omy.232 If a patent is granted and not exploited this goal is not realized. In such circum-
stances, it is recognized that others should be allowed to exploit the invention, but only
within precisely defined boundaries, prescribed by international and domestic laws.233
Prior to an amendment to theAustralianPatentsAct 1990 via the Intellectual Property
LawsAmendmentAct 2006, themain ground for compulsory licensingwas toprovide an
opportunity for others to use patented inventions when the ‘reasonable requirements
of the public’ had not been met by the patentee, through s 133 of the Patents Act 1990.
In effect, this is a type of ‘public interest’ compulsory license, available where there is a
failure on the part of the patentee to meet demand. The 2006 amendment extended
the grounds for compulsory licensing to include anti-competitive conduct. In both
cases, the licensee must pay reasonable remuneration.234 Section 133 also allows for
226 Dianne Nicol et al., The Innovation Pool in Biotechnology: the Role of Patents in Facilitat-
ing Innovation (Hobart: Centre for Law and Genetics Occasional Paper No. 8; 2014) 86–87,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2503314 (accessed Sept. 12, 2018).
227 Nicol, supra note 209, at 466.
228 Id.
229 Genetic Technologies Ltd v. Merial LLC, 818 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
230 Agreement onTrade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81, art. 31 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
231 Productivity Commission, supra note 224, at 113–68.
232 See eg Richard Nelson & Roberto Mazzoleni, Economic Theories About the Costs and Benefits of
Patents (Summary of Workshop Held at the National Academy of Sciences by the National Re-
search Council on Intellectual Property Rights and Research Tools in Molecular Biology) 17 (1997),
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record id=5758 (accessed Sept. 12, 2018); Intellectual Property and
Competition Review Committee (IPCRC) Final Report, Review of Intellectual Property Legislation under
the Competition Principles Agreement 22-3 (2000), https://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/sites/g/files/net856/
f/ergas report september 2000.pdf (accessed Sept. 12, 2018).
233 Productivity Commission, supra note 224, at 5.
234 Patents Act 1990 s 133(5)(b).
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compulsory licensing for dependent patents where a new product involves an im-
portant technical advance of considerable economic significance on the invention on
which it is dependent. Applications for compulsory licenses must be made to the Fed-
eral Court of Australia.235 To date, three applications have beenmade, and all havemet
with very limited success.236
There are also provisions in ss 163 to 170 of the Patents Act 1990, allowing for ex-
ploitation of patents by the Crown or by a person authorized by the Crown, as well
as compulsory acquisition (s 171) and assignment (s 172). Use by the Crown under s
163 is limited to exploitation ‘for the services of the Commonwealth or State’, where
that exploitation is ‘necessary for the provision of those services’. There is no require-
ment for the Crown to formally apply for an order to exploit a patented invention. Sec-
tion 165A does, however, provide a safeguard in that the patentee or their nominee can
make application for a declaration that such exploitation is not, or is no longer, neces-
sary for the proper provision of relevant services, as well as an order for the Crown to
cease exploitation.Consequently, the government remains accountable as to the appro-
priate compensation and circumstances of use.237 Like compulsory licensing, there has
been limited use of these provisions, although two cases have shown that the provisions
cover such things as the use by a state rail authority of an invention for the construction
of rail carriages,238 and the use by a local government authority of a meter relating to
measurement of water supply.239 As with compulsory licensing, compensationmust be
paid to thepatenteeby theCrown.Although thepublic laboratories undertakingBRCA
testing did not explicitly rely on Crown use, it was widely understood that they could
use this option should they need to, if a cease and desist letter was ever handed to them.
Ultimately we will never know whether this ‘threat’ played a part in GTG’s decision to
cease enforcement of the BRCA patents.
The provisions were considered by the Australian Law Reform Commission
(‘ALRC’) during its inquiry into gene patenting and human health completed in
2004,240 and were again comprehensively examined by the Productivity Commission
in 2013.241 There was general consensus in both final reports that the Crown use provi-
sions would apply when access to a patented invention is sought to facilitate the provi-
sion of public healthcare.242 The ALRC specifically referred to the provision of genetic
testing to members of the public, by a public laboratory as one example of such Crown
use. There has been further suggestion that the supply of a patented drug to patients
in a public hospital would satisfy the Crown use threshold under the Australian legis-
lation, as the provision of a service to the public would constitute an act done in the
235 Patents Act 1990 s 133(1).
236 Productivity Commission, supra note 224, at 58.
237 Id. at 170–71.
238 General Steel Industries Inc v. Commissioner of Railways 112 C.L.R. 125 (1964) (NSW).
239 Stack v. Brisbane City Council 32 I.P.R. 69 (1995). See also Productivity Commission, supra note 224, at
165–66 and particularly Box 7.1.
240 AustralianLawReformCommission (ALRC),Genes and Ingenuity:GenePatenting andHumanHealth, Re-
portNo99 (Commonwealth ofAustralia, 2004), https://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/report-99 (accessed
Sept. 12, 2018).
241 Productivity Commission, supra note 224.
242 Australian Law Reform Commission, supra note 240, at 602; Productivity Commission, supra note 224, at
171.
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performance of a duty imposed by government.243 Arguably, the provision of genetic
diagnostic testing, surgery,244 drug therapy, or gene therapy to a member of the public
could all be construed as ‘services’ undertaken in furtherance of governmental function.
Although facilitating access to a patented invention is not a specific duty or function
of health departments,245 providing access to a much-needed drug, diagnostic test, or
therapy might be.This would be the case whether the service were being provided by a
public or private health entity to undertake a function of government.246
Perhaps the most important function of the Australian compulsory licens-
ing/Crownuse system is a safeguard effect in dissuading enforcement247 against testing
services, particularly publicly funded laboratories. From this perspective, there is a pos-
sibility that the lack of patent assertion in the genetic testing area might be partially
attributed to the overriding threat of government intervention to enable the continua-
tion of testing in public laboratories.
III.B. Lessons for theUnited States
The US legal system has had long resisted compulsory licensing and price con-
trols.248 However, the policies furthered by the provisions discussed above—the in-
terest in scientific progress though research and the interest in balancing propri-
etary interests against the public interest—are well recognized.249 If the Supreme
Court’s effort to protect these through a subject matter filter unravel as a result of
legislative intervention—or if the Federal Circuit drifts significantly from Mayo and
Myriad—then the approach taken by Australia should be considered.
Australia’s experience demonstrates how government intervention on behalf of pa-
tients in the public system can be mobilized to ensure access overall. Thus, one way
to avoid ‘too much patent protection’ (in the sense of protection that is too strong)
would be for the United States to adopt, to the extent possible, a similar system. For
medicines, there is already considerable interest in allowing the federal government to
negotiate with right holders in order to lower prices for people onMedicare andMedi-
caid and, further, to providemore oversight on howprivate insurers allocate the rebates
243 Australian Law Reform Commission, supra note 240, at 598, citing Pfizer Corporation v. Ministry of Health
[1965] AC 512, 543–52.
244 It should be noted that the availability of patents for methods of surgery has been the subject of debate
for a number of years. The High Court recently held that some forms of methods of medical treatment ate
patentable. In Apotex Pty Ltd v. Sanofi Aventis Australia Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 50, although the Court held
that new methods of using known drugs were patentable, no decision was made on whether this holding ap-
plied to all methods of medical treatment (including methods of surgery).
245 See the argument in Tracey Dembo, An Examination of the Crown Use Provisions in the Patents Act 18
Australian Intellectual Property Journal 70 (2007) at 82.
246 Productivity Commission, supra note 224 at 25 (Recommendation 7-1).
247 Id. at 12–13.
248 See eg Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 & n. 21 (1980) (recounting attempts
to institute compulsory licenses); Note, Jonathan Ingram, Eliminating Innovation How Price Controls Limit
Access, 32 J. LEGALMED. 115, 119–20 (2011) (attempts to institute price controls on pharmaceuticals).
249 See eg Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 873 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (‘The purpose of a
patent system is not only to provide a financial incentive to create new knowledge and bring it to public ben-
efit through new products; it also serves to add to the body of published scientific/technologic knowledge’)
(Newman, J., dissenting in part), judgment vacated, 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
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they receive when they manage to obtain price concessions.250 While the federal gov-
ernment has yet to adopt these proposals, some states have used their clout to reduce
prices.251 A similar strategy could be embraced for diagnostics.
Both state and federal governments also enjoy regulatory authority over laborato-
ries that conduct diagnostic testing; that role could be expanded to consider pricing
issues.252 Alternatively, the federal government could create in the United States the
competition/customer dynamic present in Australia by establishing its own set of labo-
ratories. US patent law includes an analog to Australia’s Crown use in that the US gov-
ernment is exempt from infringement liability (subject to the payment of reasonable
and entire compensation).253 That provision encompasses uses by the United States
as well as by a ‘contractor, a subcontractor, or any person, firm or corporation for the
Government and with the authorization or consent of the Government’. The measure
could be construed to cover uses by laboratories designated by the government to pro-
vide testing to patients insured by the government.
The United States also plays a significant role in scientific advancement, includ-
ing in the life sciences, through funding, intramural research, and joint ventures with
private parties.254 It has been suggested that the government’s authority under the laws
that enable this support should be expanded to give it authority to constrain the price
at which drugs developed with tax dollars are sold.255 Such expanded authority could
also be deployed to limit the cost of diagnostics, to ensure that there is competition
in the diagnostics marketplace (sufficient, at least, to create opportunities for second
opinion testing and quality assurance), and to require patent holders to tolerate experi-
mental uses of their inventions. Even under existing law, there is at least one possibility
for exerting more control: the march-in provision of the Bayh Dole Act could be used
to protect the public interest in research, quality control, and second opinion testing
regarding the outcome of research supported by the federal government.256 Further-
more, given that the importation into the United States of information (such as a lab
report) produced with a patented technology does not qualify as infringing activity, 257
price competition could be fostered and access improved by encouraging healthcare
250 The Commonwealth Fund, Getting to the Root of High Prescription Drug Prices: Drivers and Poten-
tial Solutions 8, 9 & 13 (2017), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/documents/
—media files publications fund report 2017 jul waxman high drug prices drivers solutions report.pdf
(accessed Sept. 12, 2018) [hereinafter Commonwealth Fund Report].
251 See eg Note, Brendan Murphy, Getting High on Profits: An Analysis of Current State and Federal Proposals to
Rein in Soaring Drug Prices, 12 J.HEALTH&BIOMED. L. 37 (2016) (discussingmultiple approaches at the state
and federal level). See also Daniel J. Kevles,Medicare, Medicaid, and Pharmaceuticals: The Price of Innovation,
15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 241 (2015).
252 See eg Note, Peter M. Kazon, Regulatory Issues Facing Genetic Testing, 3 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 111 (2010).
253 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2006).
254 See eg E. Ray Dorsey, Jason de Roulet & Joel P. Thomson, Funding of U.S. Biomedical Research, 2003-2008,
303 JAMA 137 (2010).
255 The Commonwealth Fund Report, supra note 250, at 12–13.
256 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2018); Rai, supra note 13; Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the
Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2003). See also Gary Pulsinelli, Share and Share
Alike: Increasing Access to Government-Funded Inventions Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
393 (2006); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 108-17 (Stephen A.
Merrill, Richard C. Levin &Mark B. Myers eds., 2004)
257 Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
38  Patenting nature
providers to follow Australia’s lead and rely, when necessary, on foreign laboratories
for analysis.
To respond even more directly to Justice Breyer’s concern about ‘too much patent
protection’, the United States could also adopt Australia’s decision to enact a research
exemption.TheFederal Circuit’s opinion inMadey vDukeUniversity, which limited the
ability of academics to engage in research ‘in keepingwith the legitimate business inter-
est’ of their universities, severely restricts the availability of the common law defense.
258 After all, research conducted by trained scientists typically furthers at least some
interest of their employers. To be sure, a very broad defense could undermine the po-
tential for profits. Thus, devising a defense that protects both public interests in access
and proprietary concerns is not easy and a full discussion is beyond the scope of this ar-
ticle. However, many commentators have discussed alternatives, including recommen-
dations along the lines ofAustralia’s ‘research on’ defense.259 Indeed, there is a proposal
to couple such a defense to the legislative expansion of the subject matter category.260
In the alternative, the courts themselves could change tack and uphold the eligibility of
somepatents falling at the edges ofMyriad andMayo,while creating a broader common
law defense than currently exists post-Madey.
Finally, while it is unlikely that the United States will ever move to a compulsory
licensing system generally, the use of compulsory licenses to remedy anticompetitive
conduct iswidely accepted.261 Suchbehavior in the life sciences arena has received con-
siderable scrutiny in the last few years: antitrust law has been used to bar settlements
between patent holders and generic drug producers to pay for delayed competition and
it has been relied on to prevent product hopping.262 If clearing markets to remove op-
portunities for second opinion testing, quality assurance programs, and the like do not
rise to the level of antitrust violations, an alternative would be to consider them patent
misuse and to refuse to enforce the relevant patent until themisuse is purged.263 Along
the same lines, the Supreme Court permits courts to withhold injunctive relief when
258 Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
259 See eg Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Reconsidering Experimental Use, 50 AKRON L. REV. 699 (2016); Rochelle
Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46
ARIZ. L. REV. 457 (2004); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Varying the Course in Patenting Genetic Material: A
Counter-Proposal to Richard Epstein’s Steady Course, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THEHUMANGENOME
PROJECT (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003). See also Katherine J. Strandburg,What Does the Public Get? Experimental
Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004WISH. L. REV, 81 (2004); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair
Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV, 1177 (2000); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science:
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV, 1017 (1989).
260 See eg Banbury Center, Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, A Proposed Path Forward for Leg-
islatively Addressing Patent Eligibility Law (2016), Comments Submitted at the USPTO
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility: Roundtable 2, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/Updated%20Banbury%20Statement.pdf (accessed Sept. 12, 2018).
261 See eg United States v. Nat’l Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S.
386, 417 (1945); F.M. SCHERER, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSING 47–48 (1977)
(canvasing decrees in patent cases).
262 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (pay for delay); New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC,
787 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 2015)(product hopping).
263 See eg Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Merck & Co., 888 F.3d 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2018). See also Robin C. Feldman,The
Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for PatentMisuse, 55HASTINGS L. J. 399 (2003) (arguing that there are harms
that do not amount to an antitrust violation that should be regarded as misuse because they undermine the
public interest).
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the public interest would be disserved by enjoining the defendant’s infringing activ-
ity.264 Were the impact ofmarket-clearing and researcher-clearing activity of the patent
holder understood to constitute reason to deny injunctions, patent holders would be-
come more amenable to negotiating licenses on reasonable terms.
Admittedly, decreasing the scope of patent protection could reduce incentives to in-
novate. However, the impact of the approaches suggested above is surely less harmful
than the effect of denying patent protection entirely, as perMyriad andMayo. It is also
better than the current practice of inconsistent denials and awards of patent rights—an
approach that combines inefficient incentives with harm to the public. Moreover, em-
pirical evidence tends to suggest that concerns about incentives are exaggerated. Li-
censes issued in antitrust cases have not, apparently, discouraged innovation in the
pharmaceutical sector.265 AndMayo does not appear to have affected the development
of new diagnostics, even though (as suggested earlier), the claims in issued patents are
narrower.266
IV. CONCLUSION
To be sure, the Australian public health care system is not without its problems, but the
availability and affordability of genetic diagnostic testing has never been one of those
problems.The levels of interest and scrutiny theMyriad andMayodecisions attracted in
the United States have never really been reflected in Australia when comparator judg-
ments were handed down. The essential reason for this is that far less hinged on these
decisions: whereasMayo and to a lesser extentMyriad had the potential for dramatic
effects on rights over nature and fundamental science, D’Arcy was viewed more as an
interesting diversion. Even Justice Beach’s liberal judgment in Cargill failed to arouse
significant concern, primarily because those involved in the industry take no great is-
sue with method patents, and do not view them as a significant impediment to their
activities.
While it would be impractical to attempt to replicate the Australian environment
in the United States, there is no reason why some lessons can’t be learned from the
Australian experience with patenting nature. This article has argued that a number of
aspects of Australian jurisprudence are worth considering: a more nuanced view of the
judicial exceptions to patentability—one that better identifies claims that have signif-
icant potential to impede rather than promote progress—and a backup system that
includes structural features of the relevant industries and safeguards to protect public
welfare, such as rights to use patented genes and diagnostics to ensure unencumbered
delivery of genetic diagnostic testing. At the very least, theAustralian experience should
provide some impetus to ask where and why the US system has gone awry, and if there
really is sufficient interest in addressing its shortcomings, to prompt the examination of
alternative approaches.
264 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
265 Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals
Hurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 853 (2003).
266 Colleen V. Chien & Arti K. Rai, Dx Innovation in Decline? An Empirical Analysis post-Mayo, Pre-
sentation at the USPTO Roundtable on Section 101 (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/RT2%206-2%20Colleen%20Chien.pdf (accessed Sept. 12, 2018) (paper forth-
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